From: syzbot <syzbot+291100dcb32190ec02a8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: andrii@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, davem@davemloft.net, haoluo@google.com,
hawk@kernel.org, john.fastabend@gmail.com, jolsa@kernel.org,
kpsingh@kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, sdf@google.com, song@kernel.org,
syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, yonghong.song@linux.dev
Subject: [syzbot] [bpf?] general protection fault in bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep
Date: Sun, 03 Sep 2023 12:55:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <000000000000d97f3c060479c4f8@google.com> (raw)
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: fa09bc40b21a igb: disable virtualization features on 82580
git tree: net
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13382fa8680000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=634e05b4025da9da
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=291100dcb32190ec02a8
compiler: gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1529c448680000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=15db0248680000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/7ab461d84992/disk-fa09bc40.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/3ac6d43ab2db/vmlinux-fa09bc40.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/778d096a134e/bzImage-fa09bc40.xz
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+291100dcb32190ec02a8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 PID: 5055 Comm: syz-executor625 Not tainted 6.5.0-syzkaller-04012-gfa09bc40b21a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep+0xaa/0x170 kernel/bpf/offload.c:295
Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 a1 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 65 10 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 93 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffc900039ff7f8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc9000156e000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81a8cf76 RDI: ffff888021b25f10
RBP: ffff888021b25f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff195203d
R10: ffffffff8ca901ef R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffc9000156e060
FS: 0000555556071380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000022f6b000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_check+0x52f3/0xabd0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:19762
bpf_prog_load+0x153a/0x2270 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2708
__sys_bpf+0xbb6/0x4e90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5335
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5439 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5437 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0xc0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5437
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f7c0df78ea9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffde3592128 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f7c0df78ea9
RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 0000000020000940 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000100000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep+0xaa/0x170 kernel/bpf/offload.c:295
Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 a1 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 65 10 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 93 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffc900039ff7f8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc9000156e000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81a8cf76 RDI: ffff888021b25f10
RBP: ffff888021b25f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff195203d
R10: ffffffff8ca901ef R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffc9000156e060
FS: 0000555556071380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000022f6b000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess), 3 bytes skipped:
0: df 48 89 fisttps -0x77(%rax)
3: fa cli
4: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx
8: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1)
c: 0f 85 a1 00 00 00 jne 0xb3
12: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax
19: fc ff df
1c: 4c 8b 65 10 mov 0x10(%rbp),%r12
20: 4c 89 e2 mov %r12,%rdx
23: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx
* 27: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction
2b: 0f 85 93 00 00 00 jne 0xc4
31: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax
38: fc ff df
3b: 4d rex.WRB
3c: 8b .byte 0x8b
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
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next reply other threads:[~2023-09-03 19:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-03 19:55 syzbot [this message]
2023-09-06 12:40 ` [syzbot] [bpf?] general protection fault in bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep Eduard Zingerman
2023-09-06 13:50 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-09-06 13:54 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-09-06 14:57 ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-09-06 18:00 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-09-06 18:34 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2023-09-09 16:12 ` syzbot
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