diff for duplicates of <014301d27760$e4d8b9a0$ae8a2ce0$@mindspring.com> diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest index a66fb0f..42da57d 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N1/content_digest @@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ "To\0'Andy Lutomirski' <luto@amacapital.net>" " 'Ben Hutchings' <ben@decadent.org.uk>\0" "Cc\0'Andy Lutomirski' <luto@kernel.org>" - <security@kernel.org> + security@kernel.org 'Konstantin Khlebnikov' <koct9i@gmail.com> 'Alexander Viro' <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> 'Kees Cook' <keescook@chromium.org> 'Willy Tarreau' <w@1wt.eu> - <linux-mm@kvack.org> + linux-mm@kvack.org 'Andrew Morton' <akpm@linux-foundation.org> 'yalin wang' <yalin.wang2010@gmail.com> 'Linux Kernel Mailing List' <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> @@ -82,4 +82,4 @@ "see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .\n" "Don't email: <a href=mailto:\"dont@kvack.org\"> email@kvack.org </a>" -e385492097d27ff95f8255c548cf289d9e096b7a1b7abff10b1921b6fa9159af +02b74f1c405be681e8b850282aa7b52ba377750f458bf19b726c56e6415d9d38
diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N2/1.txt index d0e7c05..7fd2708 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N2/1.txt @@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ > > least currently the unprivileged program is going to clear the setgid > > bit when it writes. This change would make that behaviour more > > dangerous. -> +> > Hmm. Although, if a privileged program does something like: -> +> > (sudo -u nobody echo blah) >setuid_program -> +> > presumably it wanted to make the change. I'm not following all the intricacies here, though I need to... @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ Ganesha does some permission checking, but this is one area I want to defer to t > > involved virtual files with special semantics, where it's clearer that > > a privileged process should not pass them to an unprivileged process.) > > -> +> > I could go either way. -> +> > What I really want to do is to write a third patch that isn't for -stable that just > removes the capable() check entirely. I'm reasonably confident it won't > break things for a silly reason: because it's capable() and not ns_capable(), @@ -51,9 +51,3 @@ Frank --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus - --- -To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in -the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, -see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . -Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a> diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N2/content_digest index a66fb0f..56a2fb5 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N2/content_digest @@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ "> > least currently the unprivileged program is going to clear the setgid\n" "> > bit when it writes. This change would make that behaviour more\n" "> > dangerous.\n" - ">\n" + "> \n" "> Hmm. Although, if a privileged program does something like:\n" - ">\n" + "> \n" "> (sudo -u nobody echo blah) >setuid_program\n" - ">\n" + "> \n" "> presumably it wanted to make the change.\n" "\n" "I'm not following all the intricacies here, though I need to...\n" @@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ "> > involved virtual files with special semantics, where it's clearer that\n" "> > a privileged process should not pass them to an unprivileged process.)\n" "> >\n" - ">\n" + "> \n" "> I could go either way.\n" - ">\n" + "> \n" "> What I really want to do is to write a third patch that isn't for -stable that just\n" "> removes the capable() check entirely. I'm reasonably confident it won't\n" "> break things for a silly reason: because it's capable() and not ns_capable(),\n" @@ -74,12 +74,6 @@ "\n" "---\n" "This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.\n" - "https://www.avast.com/antivirus\n" - "\n" - "--\n" - "To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in\n" - "the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,\n" - "see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .\n" - "Don't email: <a href=mailto:\"dont@kvack.org\"> email@kvack.org </a>" + https://www.avast.com/antivirus -e385492097d27ff95f8255c548cf289d9e096b7a1b7abff10b1921b6fa9159af +3bb0c2b2ed93fe9e6a46c510976c8fa34c32366c8fc13370fa0df3df378083d0
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