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From: Dhananjay Phadke <dphadke@linux.microsoft.com>
To: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] image: Control FIT signature verification at runtime
Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 14:54:51 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <016ae207-2ecb-1817-d10e-12819c8c40ef@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3c14e608-ca3d-4b79-9dfa-4f65ea1fc742@www.fastmail.com>

On 2/8/2022 1:55 PM, Andrew Jeffery wrote:
> Right, just as strap pin controlling the SB ROM in the 2600 allows bypass.
> 
> It's just another one of these affecting a different boot stage.

Why would someone leave such external exploit open in production?
Fusing OTPCFG0[6]=1 would ignore external strap and OTPCFG0[1]=1 would 
enable secure boot with no way to bypass.

Regards,
Dhananjay

  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-12 22:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-31  3:41 [PATCH] image: Control FIT signature verification at runtime Andrew Jeffery
2022-01-31  3:41 ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-07  1:07 ` ChiaWei Wang
2022-02-07  1:07   ` ChiaWei Wang
2022-02-08 21:55   ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-08 21:55     ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-12 22:54     ` Dhananjay Phadke [this message]
2022-02-12 18:55 ` Alex G.
2022-02-12 18:55   ` Alex G.
2022-02-14  1:13   ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-14  1:13     ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-14 19:14     ` Dhananjay Phadke
2022-02-14 19:14       ` Dhananjay Phadke
2022-02-14 23:08       ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-14 23:08         ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-14 23:13       ` Patrick Williams
2022-02-14 23:13         ` Patrick Williams
2022-02-15  0:21         ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-15  0:21           ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-15  3:12         ` Dhananjay Phadke
2022-02-15  3:12           ` Dhananjay Phadke
2022-02-15  3:25           ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-15  3:25             ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-28  1:29             ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-28  1:29               ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-28 22:12               ` Alex G.
2022-02-28 22:12                 ` Alex G.
2022-02-28 22:42                 ` Andrew Jeffery
2022-02-28 22:42                   ` Andrew Jeffery

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