From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
mpatocka@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 21:44:09 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <06bb61dc838eeff63bb5f11cea6d4b53@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1716583609-21790-16-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
On May 24, 2024 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
> authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
> signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
> e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
> files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
> a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
> control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
> could be established to permit the execution of all files with verified
> built-in fsverity signatures while restricting kernel module loading
> from specified fsverity files via fsverity digests.
>
> The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
> fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
> is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
> that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
> subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
> signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
> crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
> effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
> stack interactions.
>
> The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
> documentation in fsverity.rst.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
> v1-v6:
> + Not present
>
> v7:
> Introduced
>
> v8:
> + Split fs/verity/ changes and security/ changes into separate patches
> + Change signature of fsverity_create_info to accept non-const inode
> + Change signature of fsverity_verify_signature to accept non-const inode
> + Don't cast-away const from inode.
> + Digest functionality dropped in favor of:
> ("fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected
> file digest")
> + Reworded commit description and title to match changes.
> + Fix a bug wherein no LSM implements the particular fsverity @name
> (or LSM is disabled), and returns -EOPNOTSUPP, causing errors.
>
> v9:
> + No changes
>
> v10:
> + Rename the signature blob key
> + Cleanup redundant code
> + Make the hook call depends on CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
>
> v11:
> + No changes
>
> v12:
> + Add constification to the hook call
>
> v13:
> + No changes
>
> v14:
> + Add doc/comment to built-in signature verification
>
> v15:
> + Add more docs related to IPE
> + Switch the hook call to security_inode_setintegrity()
>
> v16:
> + Explicitly mention "fsverity builtin signatures" in the commit
> message
> + Amend documentation in fsverity.rst
> + Fix format issue
> + Change enum name
>
> v17:
> + Fix various documentation issues
> + Use new enum name LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID
>
> v18:
> + Fix typos
> + Move the inode_setintegrity hook call into fsverity_verify_signature()
>
> v19:
> + Cleanup code w.r.t inode_setintegrity hook refactoring
> ---
> Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
> fs/verity/signature.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/fs/verity/signature.c b/fs/verity/signature.c
> index 90c07573dd77..a4ed91c7049f 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/signature.c
> +++ b/fs/verity/signature.c
> @@ -106,6 +111,17 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
> return err;
> }
>
> + err = security_inode_setintegrity(inode,
> + LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID,
> + signature,
> + le32_to_cpu(sig_size));
I like this much better without the explicit inode cast :)
> + if (err) {
> + fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d exposing file signature to LSMs",
> + err);
> + return err;
> + }
> +
> return 0;
> }
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-30 1:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-24 20:46 [PATCH v19 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 11/20] block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block device Fan Wu
2024-05-31 20:48 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-25 9:02 ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-31 21:07 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 13/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-30 1:44 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-30 3:58 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-30 5:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-30 5:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 14/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-30 1:44 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-05-30 5:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-30 6:01 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-30 6:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-30 1:46 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-30 3:06 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-30 3:38 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-30 20:54 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-31 0:43 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-31 15:51 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-31 17:47 ` Eric Biggers
2024-06-03 1:40 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 16/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 17/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 18/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 19/20] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu
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