From: Timothy Wood <timothy@hallcomp.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tislabs.com>
Cc: SELinux <SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: new LSM ver
Date: 08 Jul 2002 11:19:55 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1026141595.1724.71.camel@phobos> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.4.33.0207081029490.19100-100000@raven>
В Пнд, 08.07.2002, в 10:39, Stephen Smalley написал:
>
> On 8 Jul 2002, Timothy Wood wrote:
>
> > So what is going ot be done about root permissions and such since you
> > are restricting them now? I mean there are just some things you have to
> > be root and have root permissions to run. Are you rewriting everything
> > to run based on security context instead of user? That would be ideal,
> > no I take that back, that would be awesome if things would run based on
> > security context of the user running them. Then you could get rid of
> > root altogether.
> >
> > Anywho (sorry for the rant) a really good/simple example of the new
> > default context is this. Lets say you want to add a new user... oh
> > wait, you can't! Why? No one but root can do this and now, not even
> > root can't do it. Did a primary service, such as named, bail out for
> > some reason? Too bad! You do not have any way to restart it except by
> > rebooting the server. Same reason, root only.
> >
> > But don't get me wrong. Getting rid of root is a good idea but it's too
> > early in the game to make changes like this. It pretty much breaks the
> > system in enforcing mode.
>
> I think you've misunderstood what we've done. We have merely changed the
> default login context for root to the user_r role, and prohibited direct
> ssh logins in the sysadm_r role. For administration, you can still login
> as yourself, run newrole to change to sysadm_r, and run su to obtain the
> Linux root user identity. Or, you can login as root if you permit direct
> root logins and then run newrole to change to sysadm_r.
>
> The change simply ensures that a vulnerability in sshd does not open a
> direct path to sysadm_r. The attacker will not be able to reach sysadm_r
> without authenticating to newrole.
This is true. You can also merely change the context when you login (if
you log in as root). I suppose I jumpped the gun a little there,
however I do like the idea of severely restricting root or removing root
altogether. Would I be correct in that pretty much everything would
have to be rewritten if this were to be accomplished (the removal of
root, that is)?
Timothy,
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2002-07-08 15:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2002-07-05 23:21 new LSM ver Timothy Wood
2002-07-06 15:35 ` poweroff problem? Leslie J. French
2002-07-07 13:32 ` new LSM ver Russell Coker
2002-07-08 11:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2002-07-08 14:31 ` Timothy Wood
2002-07-08 14:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2002-07-08 15:19 ` Timothy Wood [this message]
2002-07-08 16:30 ` Stephen Smalley
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