From: Russell Coker <rcoker@redhat.com>
To: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
SE Linux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Joshua Brindle <jbrindle@snu.edu>,
Jim Carter <jwcart2@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Single home directory type for all roles.
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 13:23:34 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1102645414.4509.105.camel@aeon> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1102632223.10785.36.camel@nexus.verbum.private>
On Thu, 2004-12-09 at 17:43 -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
> On Fri, 2004-12-10 at 05:02 +1100, Russell Coker wrote:
> > Currently the default policy has /root labeled as staff_home_dir_t.
> > This significantly weakens the boundaries between staff_r and sysadm_r.
>
> I don't see there as being an interesting boundary between staff_r and
> sysadm_r. The reason I see staff_r as separated is because it has no
> interaction with user_r, which closes a lot of possible attacks.
Among other things a default configuration allows sshd to permit logins
as staff_r but not sysadm_r. If a sshd was suspected to be compromised
then you could login at the console as sysadm_r to fix things IFF /root
was not writable to staff_r domains. If a session launched by sshd can
directly modify files under /root then if you suspected a sshd
compromise then the only option would be to boot from recovery media.
Also note that many daemons look for configuration or data files
under /root, this is due to bugs in daemons but many of them are not
expected to be fixed for quite a while. Until/unless we get the daemons
in question fixed staff_t can be used to modify the behavior of daemons
with the current labeling of /root (NB in most cases the daemon will
operate without permission to read files under the /root directory, but
even the existence of files can change the behavior).
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2004-12-10 2:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2004-12-07 0:08 patch: add can_create() macro, allow file_type_auto_trans(a,b,c, { file dir }) Thomas Bleher
2004-12-08 19:32 ` James Carter
2004-12-09 16:31 ` Some more fixes Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-09 18:35 ` Thomas Bleher
2004-12-10 20:14 ` James Carter
2004-12-09 16:50 ` Single home directory type for all roles Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-09 17:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-09 17:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-10 16:23 ` Manipulating user roles without policy-sources installed Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-10 16:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-10 18:09 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-10 18:38 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-09 17:47 ` Single home directory type for all roles Russell Coker
2004-12-09 17:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-09 18:12 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 18:18 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-09 18:45 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-09 19:08 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 20:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2004-12-10 12:20 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-10 15:22 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2004-12-10 16:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2004-12-10 17:00 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2004-12-10 17:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-10 17:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2004-12-09 20:40 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2004-12-10 3:03 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-10 14:09 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-10 14:31 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-10 15:43 ` Colin Walters
2004-12-10 16:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2004-12-13 13:25 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-13 13:56 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-13 14:19 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 19:07 ` Thomas Bleher
2004-12-09 19:19 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 17:28 ` Colin Walters
2004-12-09 18:02 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 19:45 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-09 20:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-09 20:13 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 20:22 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-09 20:30 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 21:38 ` Thomas Bleher
2004-12-10 2:56 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 22:29 ` Colin Walters
2004-12-10 13:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-10 16:28 ` Colin Walters
2004-12-09 21:16 ` Thomas Bleher
2004-12-10 2:58 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 22:43 ` Colin Walters
2004-12-10 2:23 ` Russell Coker [this message]
2004-12-10 15:48 ` Colin Walters
2004-12-10 21:58 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-12-09 19:38 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-09 19:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-09 20:09 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-12-09 20:17 ` Russell Coker
2004-12-09 20:38 ` Daniel J Walsh
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2004-12-09 18:50 Alex Ackerman
2004-12-09 19:29 ` Russell Coker
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