From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Harry Butterworth Subject: Re: [PATCH][ACM] kernel enforcement of vbd policies via blkback driver Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2006 17:36:43 +0100 Message-ID: <1154018203.7906.40.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1154017584.7906.36.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1154017584.7906.36.camel@localhost.localdomain> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com To: Reiner Sailer Cc: Andrew Warfield , xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, xense-devel@lists.xensource.com, Bryan D Payne , ncmike@us.ibm.com List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Thu, 2006-07-27 at 17:26 +0100, Harry Butterworth wrote: > untrusted driver domain <-> trusted encryption domain <-> FE-domain > hypervisor > trusted access control domain Another argument in favour of this kind of approach is that if your BE is something like a fibrechannel driver for a SAN, there isn't actually any security on the SAN side of it so any guarantees provided by the driver domain are pretty much worthless. Harry.