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From: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
To: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@TrustedCS.com>
Cc: SELinux List <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Joshua Brindle <jbrindle@tresys.com>,
	Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>,
	Linda Knippers <linda.knippers@hp.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/3] reference policy: add "context" security class
Date: Thu, 05 Oct 2006 14:50:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1160074231.26418.30.camel@sgc> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4525496E.4090209@trustedcs.com>

On Thu, 2006-10-05 at 13:05 -0500, Darrel Goeddel wrote:
> Define a new security class "context" and its permission "translate" for
> use by the context translation daemon.  The bit of policy added to the
> setrans_translate_context interface only allows for translation of
> domains and file_contexts.  You can see how this is bad if you try to
> ls -Z /dev.

Yes, as device nodes don't have the file_type attribute, they have
device_node.

> I don't have a trick to allow TE access to every type other
> than grabbing some "big" attributes, then listing every remaining type.
> That obviously does not work in the modular policy model anyway.  Any
> ideas on how we could maybe handle that one? (assuming that anyone else
> does not want TE restriction on the translations :))  How about a
> privilege to use '*' or '~' in typesets...

It shouldn't be to hard to build up, we just need things like:

files_translate_all_contexts()
corenet_translate_all_contexts()
fs_translate_all_contexts()
dev_translate_all_contexts()
domain_translate_all_contexts()

I believe that are the modules that need translate interfaces, and that
should be fairly comprehensive coverage (not complete).

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2006-10-05 18:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-10-05 18:05 [RFC PATCH 1/3] reference policy: add "context" security class Darrel Goeddel
2006-10-05 18:49 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-10-05 19:20   ` Darrel Goeddel
2006-10-05 19:40     ` Stephen Smalley
2006-10-05 19:50       ` Darrel Goeddel
2006-10-05 19:47     ` Joshua Brindle
2006-10-05 18:50 ` Christopher J. PeBenito [this message]
2006-10-05 19:29   ` Darrel Goeddel

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