[PATCH 3/4] [AMD IOMMU] Enable PCI passthru for HVM guest

["Wei Wang2" <wei.wang2@amd.com>]

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3-passthru-xen.patch: passthru support, modifications to in xen and vtd
code
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>

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diff -r e8ebbe7635c5 xen/arch/x86/domain.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c	Thu Nov 29 20:03:51 2007 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c	Fri Nov 30 12:04:37 2007 +0100
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/nmi.h>
 #include <asm/iommu.h>
+#include <asm/amd-iommu.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 #include <compat/vcpu.h>
 #endif
@@ -518,11 +519,15 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d)
     if ( (rc = iommu_domain_init(d)) != 0 )
         goto fail;
 
+    if ( (rc = amd_iommu_domain_init(d)) != 0 )
+        goto fail;
+
     if ( is_hvm_domain(d) )
     {
         if ( (rc = hvm_domain_initialise(d)) != 0 )
         {
             iommu_domain_destroy(d);
+            amd_iommu_domain_destroy(d);
             goto fail;
         }
     }
@@ -555,6 +560,8 @@ void arch_domain_destroy(struct domain *
         hvm_domain_destroy(d);
 
     iommu_domain_destroy(d);
+
+    amd_iommu_domain_destroy(d);
 
     paging_final_teardown(d);
 
diff -r e8ebbe7635c5 xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c	Thu Nov 29 20:03:51 2007 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c	Fri Nov 30 12:04:37 2007 +0100
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <xsm/xsm.h>
 #include <asm/iommu.h>
+#include <asm/amd-iommu.h>
 
 long arch_do_domctl(
     struct xen_domctl *domctl,
@@ -532,7 +533,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         u8 bus, devfn;
 
         ret = -EINVAL;
-        if ( !vtd_enabled )
+        if ( !vtd_enabled && !amd_iommu_enabled )
             break;
 
         if ( unlikely((d = get_domain_by_id(domctl->domain)) == NULL) )
@@ -548,7 +549,11 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         if ( device_assigned(bus, devfn) )
             break;
 
-        ret = assign_device(d, bus, devfn);
+        if ( vtd_enabled )
+            ret = assign_device(d, bus, devfn);
+        else if ( amd_iommu_enabled )
+            ret = amd_iommu_assign_device(d, bus, devfn);
+
         gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device: bdf = %x:%x:%x\n",
             bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
         put_domain(d);
@@ -564,7 +569,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domctl->domain)) == NULL )
             break;
         bind = &(domctl->u.bind_pt_irq);
-        if (vtd_enabled)
+        if ( vtd_enabled || amd_iommu_enabled )
             ret = pt_irq_create_bind_vtd(d, bind);
         if (ret < 0)
             gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "pt_irq_create_bind failed!\n");
diff -r e8ebbe7635c5 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/intr.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/intr.c	Thu Nov 29 20:03:51 2007 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/intr.c	Fri Nov 30 12:04:37 2007 +0100
@@ -94,6 +94,46 @@ static void enable_intr_window(struct vc
     vmcb->general1_intercepts |= GENERAL1_INTERCEPT_VINTR;
 }
 
+static void svm_dirq_assist(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+    unsigned int irq;
+    uint32_t device, intx;
+    struct domain *d = v->domain;
+    struct hvm_irq_dpci *hvm_irq_dpci = d->arch.hvm_domain.irq.dpci;
+    struct dev_intx_gsi_link *digl;
+
+    if ( !amd_iommu_enabled || (v->vcpu_id != 0) || (hvm_irq_dpci == NULL) )
+        return;
+
+    for ( irq = find_first_bit(hvm_irq_dpci->dirq_mask, NR_IRQS);
+          irq < NR_IRQS;
+          irq = find_next_bit(hvm_irq_dpci->dirq_mask, NR_IRQS, irq + 1) )
+    {
+        stop_timer(&hvm_irq_dpci->hvm_timer[irq_to_vector(irq)]);
+        clear_bit(irq, &hvm_irq_dpci->dirq_mask);
+
+        list_for_each_entry ( digl, &hvm_irq_dpci->mirq[irq].digl_list, list )
+        {
+            device = digl->device;
+            intx = digl->intx;
+            hvm_pci_intx_assert(d, device, intx);
+            spin_lock(&hvm_irq_dpci->dirq_lock);
+            hvm_irq_dpci->mirq[irq].pending++;
+            spin_unlock(&hvm_irq_dpci->dirq_lock);
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Set a timer to see if the guest can finish the interrupt or not. For
+         * example, the guest OS may unmask the PIC during boot, before the
+         * guest driver is loaded. hvm_pci_intx_assert() may succeed, but the
+         * guest will never deal with the irq, then the physical interrupt line
+         * will never be deasserted.
+         */
+        set_timer(&hvm_irq_dpci->hvm_timer[irq_to_vector(irq)],
+                  NOW() + PT_IRQ_TIME_OUT);
+    }
+}
+
 asmlinkage void svm_intr_assist(void) 
 {
     struct vcpu *v = current;
@@ -102,6 +142,7 @@ asmlinkage void svm_intr_assist(void)
 
     /* Crank the handle on interrupt state. */
     pt_update_irq(v);
+    svm_dirq_assist(v);
     hvm_set_callback_irq_level();
 
     do {
diff -r e8ebbe7635c5 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vioapic.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vioapic.c	Thu Nov 29 20:03:51 2007 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vioapic.c	Fri Nov 30 12:04:37 2007 +0100
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ void vioapic_update_EOI(struct domain *d
 
     ent->fields.remote_irr = 0;
 
-    if ( vtd_enabled )
+    if ( vtd_enabled || amd_iommu_enabled )
     {
         spin_unlock(&d->arch.hvm_domain.irq_lock);
         hvm_dpci_eoi(current->domain, gsi, ent);
diff -r e8ebbe7635c5 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vtd/io.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vtd/io.c	Thu Nov 29 20:03:51 2007 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vtd/io.c	Fri Nov 30 12:04:37 2007 +0100
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ int hvm_do_IRQ_dpci(struct domain *d, un
 {
     struct hvm_irq *hvm_irq = &d->arch.hvm_domain.irq;
 
-    if ( !vtd_enabled || (d == dom0) || (hvm_irq->dpci == NULL) ||
+    if ( (!vtd_enabled && !amd_iommu_enabled) || (d == dom0) || (hvm_irq->dpci == NULL) ||
          !hvm_irq->dpci->mirq[mirq].valid )
         return 0;
 
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static void hvm_dpci_isairq_eoi(struct d
     int i;
 
     ASSERT(isairq < NR_ISAIRQS);
-    if ( !vtd_enabled || !dpci ||
+    if ( (!vtd_enabled && !amd_iommu_enabled) || !dpci ||
          !test_bit(isairq, dpci->isairq_map) )
         return;
 
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ void hvm_dpci_eoi(struct domain *d, unsi
     struct hvm_irq_dpci *hvm_irq_dpci = d->arch.hvm_domain.irq.dpci;
     uint32_t device, intx, machine_gsi;
 
-    if ( !vtd_enabled || (hvm_irq_dpci == NULL) ||
+    if ( (!vtd_enabled && !amd_iommu_enabled) || (hvm_irq_dpci == NULL) ||
          (guest_gsi >= NR_ISAIRQS &&
           !hvm_irq_dpci->girq[guest_gsi].valid) )
         return;
diff -r e8ebbe7635c5 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c	Thu Nov 29 20:03:51 2007 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c	Fri Nov 30 12:04:37 2007 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <asm/paging.h>
 #include <asm/p2m.h>
 #include <asm/iommu.h>
+#include <asm/amd-iommu.h>
 
 /* Debugging and auditing of the P2M code? */
 #define P2M_AUDIT     0
@@ -257,6 +258,14 @@ set_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned
 
     if ( vtd_enabled && (p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct) && is_hvm_domain(d) )
         iommu_flush(d, gfn, (u64*)p2m_entry);
+
+    if ( amd_iommu_enabled && is_hvm_domain(d) && (p2mt != p2m_mmio_direct))
+    {
+        if ( mfn_valid(mfn) )
+            amd_iommu_map_page(d, gfn, mfn_x(mfn));
+        else
+            amd_iommu_unmap_page(d, gfn);
+    }
 
     /* Success */
     rv = 1;

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