From: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 11/12] random pt4: Move syncookies to net/
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2005 15:41:08 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <12.314297600@selenic.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <11.314297600@selenic.com>
Move syncookie code off to networking land.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Index: rnd2/drivers/char/random.c
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/drivers/char/random.c 2005-01-20 10:16:13.830687244 -0800
+++ rnd2/drivers/char/random.c 2005-01-20 10:16:43.345924372 -0800
@@ -366,10 +366,6 @@
* hash; hash collisions will occur no more often than chance.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
-static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
-#endif
-
/*
* Static global variables
*/
@@ -901,9 +897,6 @@
init_std_data(&input_pool);
init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
init_std_data(&nonblocking_pool);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
- get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
-#endif
return 0;
}
module_init(rand_initialize);
@@ -1578,78 +1571,4 @@
return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
-/*
- * Secure SYN cookie computation. This is the algorithm worked out by
- * Dan Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
- *
- * For linux I implement the 1 minute counter by looking at the jiffies clock.
- * The count is passed in as a parameter, so this code doesn't much care.
- */
-
-#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
-#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
-
-static u32 cookie_hash(u32 saddr, u32 daddr, u32 sport, u32 dport,
- u32 count, int c)
-{
- __u32 tmp[16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
-
- memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
- tmp[0] = saddr;
- tmp[1] = daddr;
- tmp[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
- tmp[3] = count;
- sha_transform(tmp + 16, tmp);
-
- return tmp[17];
-}
-
-__u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
- __u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 data)
-{
- /*
- * Compute the secure sequence number.
- * The output should be:
- * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
- * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
- * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
- * minute by 1.
- * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
- * MSS into the second hash value.
- */
-
- return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
- sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
- ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
- & COOKIEMASK));
-}
-
-/*
- * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
- * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
- * range. This must be checked by the caller.
- *
- * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
- * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
- * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
- */
-__u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
- __u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
-{
- __u32 diff;
-
- /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
- cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
-
- /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
- diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32)-1 >> COOKIEBITS);
- if (diff >= maxdiff)
- return (__u32)-1;
-
- return (cookie -
- cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
- & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
-}
-#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
Index: rnd2/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/net/ipv4/syncookies.c 2005-01-20 10:15:30.628195094 -0800
+++ rnd2/net/ipv4/syncookies.c 2005-01-20 10:16:24.202364968 -0800
@@ -17,11 +17,88 @@
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies;
+static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
+static __init int init_syncookies(void)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
+ return 0;
+}
+module_init(init_syncookies);
+
+#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
+#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
+
+static u32 cookie_hash(u32 saddr, u32 daddr, u32 sport, u32 dport,
+ u32 count, int c)
+{
+ __u32 tmp[16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+
+ memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
+ tmp[0] = saddr;
+ tmp[1] = daddr;
+ tmp[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
+ tmp[3] = count;
+ sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
+
+ return tmp[17];
+}
+
+static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
+ __u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
+ __u32 data)
+{
+ /*
+ * Compute the secure sequence number.
+ * The output should be:
+ * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
+ * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
+ * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
+ * minute by 1.
+ * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
+ * MSS into the second hash value.
+ */
+
+ return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
+ sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
+ ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
+ & COOKIEMASK));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
+ * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
+ * range. This must be checked by the caller.
+ *
+ * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
+ * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
+ * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
+ */
+static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport, __u32 sseq,
+ __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
+{
+ __u32 diff;
+
+ /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
+ cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
+
+ /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
+ diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
+ if (diff >= maxdiff)
+ return (__u32)-1;
+
+ return (cookie -
+ cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
+ & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
+}
+
/*
* This table has to be sorted and terminated with (__u16)-1.
* XXX generate a better table.
Index: rnd2/include/linux/random.h
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/include/linux/random.h 2005-01-20 10:15:30.628195094 -0800
+++ rnd2/include/linux/random.h 2005-01-20 10:16:24.202364968 -0800
@@ -55,14 +55,6 @@
extern u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport);
extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport);
-extern __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
- __u16 sport, __u16 dport,
- __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
- __u32 data);
-extern __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr,
- __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
- __u16 dport, __u32 sseq,
- __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff);
extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-01-21 21:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-01-21 21:41 [PATCH 0/12] random pt4: Moving and sharing code Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 1/12] random pt4: Create new rol32/ror32 bitops Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 2/12] random pt4: Use them throughout the tree Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 3/12] random pt4: Kill the SHA variants Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 4/12] random pt4: Cleanup SHA interface Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 5/12] random pt4: Move SHA code to lib/ Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 6/12] random pt4: Replace SHA with faster version Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 7/12] random pt4: Update cryptolib to use SHA fro lib Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 8/12] random pt4: Move halfmd4 to lib Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 9/12] random pt4: Kill duplicate halfmd4 in ext3 htree Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 10/12] random pt4: Simplify and shrink syncookie code Matt Mackall
2005-01-21 21:41 ` Matt Mackall [this message]
2005-01-21 21:41 ` [PATCH 12/12] random pt4: Move other tcp/ip bits to net/ Matt Mackall
2005-01-26 1:33 ` [PATCH 7/12] random pt4: Update cryptolib to use SHA fro lib Lee Revell
2005-01-26 1:42 ` Matt Mackall
2005-01-25 21:07 ` [PATCH 6/12] random pt4: Replace SHA with faster version Denis Vlasenko
2005-01-25 21:14 ` Matt Mackall
2005-01-25 21:31 ` Denis Vlasenko
2005-01-25 21:50 ` [PATCH] SHA1 clarify kerneldoc Matt Mackall
2005-01-27 18:22 ` Bill Davidsen
2005-01-27 19:28 ` Matt Mackall
2005-01-25 20:49 ` [PATCH 4/12] random pt4: Cleanup SHA interface Denis Vlasenko
2005-01-25 21:01 ` Matt Mackall
2005-01-25 21:02 ` [PATCH 1/12] random pt4: Create new rol32/ror32 bitops Denis Vlasenko
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