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From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: selinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: sds@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org, Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Subject: [PATCH-v3] SELinux: introduce permissive types
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2008 18:35:57 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1205188557.5297.66.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)

Introduce the concept of a permissive type.  A new ebitmap is introduced
to the policy database which indicates if a given type has the
permissive bit set or not.  This bit is tested for the scontext of any
denial.  The bit is meaningless on types which only appear as the target
of a decision and never the source.  A domain running with a permissive
type will be allowed to perform any action similarly to when the system
is globally set permissive.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

---

- Threw out all of the atomic stuff.  Either the sid is going to get
mapped to unlabeled or to the right context in the new policydb and will
be the new type number and all will be well.  As usual I was just making
things harder on myself.
- moved !requested into its own handling
- dropped unlikely() around the permissive sid, because really, if we
get a denial and we are selinux_enforcing its actually not all that
unlikely that we might not have a permissive domain.  Just let the
compiler do its thing.
- dropped the test for the existence of node.  avc_update_node might
return -ENOENT, but really who cares?  We are on a slow code path here
so it seems to be needless complexity.  Isn't this code nice and clear
now?  I can add it in, but its just a slight perf win and not much
else..

 security/selinux/Kconfig            |    2 +-
 security/selinux/avc.c              |   18 +++++++++++++-----
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    5 ++++-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      |   11 +++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |    2 ++
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 2b517d6..a436d1c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 	int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-	range 15 22
+	range 15 23
 	default 19
 	help
 	  This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 187964e..8d78b88 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -890,13 +890,21 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
 
-	if (!requested || denied) {
-		if (selinux_enforcing || (flags & AVC_STRICT))
+	if (unlikely(!requested)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: found !requested, fix me\n", __func__);
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		if (selinux_enforcing)
 			rc = -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	if (denied) {
+		if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
+			avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
+					tsid, tclass);
 		else
-			if (node)
-				avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT,requested,
-						ssid,tsid,tclass);
+			rc = -EACCES;
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index f7d2f03..fde8690 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -26,13 +26,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB		20
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS	21
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP		22
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	23
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE
 #endif
 
 #define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
@@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ struct av_decision {
 	u32 seqno;
 };
 
+int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid);
+
 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 	struct av_decision *avd);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index bd7d6a0..84dbab9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	}
 };
 
@@ -194,6 +199,7 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 		goto out_free_symtab;
 
 	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
 
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -687,6 +693,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	kfree(p->type_attr_map);
 	kfree(p->undefined_perms);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
 	return;
 }
@@ -1570,6 +1577,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	    ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp) != 0)
 		goto bad;
 
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE &&
+	    ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp) != 0)
+		goto bad;
+
 	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
 	if (!info) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to find policy compat info "
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index c4ce996..ba593a3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -243,6 +243,8 @@ struct policydb {
 
 	struct ebitmap policycaps;
 
+	struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+
 	unsigned int policyvers;
 
 	unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f374186..f5d1dcc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -416,6 +416,27 @@ inval_class:
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Given a sid find if the type has the permissive flag set
+ */
+int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid)
+{
+	struct context *context;
+	u32 type;
+	int rc;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	BUG_ON(!context);
+
+	type = context->type;
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, type);
+
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
                                            struct context *ncontext,
                                            struct context *tcontext,



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             reply	other threads:[~2008-03-10 22:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-03-10 22:35 Eric Paris [this message]
2008-03-11 15:18 ` [PATCH-v3] SELinux: introduce permissive types Stephen Smalley
2008-03-11 17:08   ` Semanage return codes Hasan Rezaul-CHR010
2008-03-11 17:17     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-12  2:30   ` [PATCH-v3] SELinux: introduce permissive types Daniel J Walsh

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