Re: [PATCH 2/3] SELinux: call capabilities code directory

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On Mon, 2009-02-09 at 16:37 -0500, Eric Paris wrote:
> For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead
> call capabilities code directly.  capabilities are the only module that
> selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking
> might be possible.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |   28 ++++++++++++++--------------
>  1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 6e6847d..e2bdb28 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2087,7 +2087,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
>   * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
>   * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
>   *
> - * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
> + * Note that cap_capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0

This part of the comment is a bit out of date - at this point we are
just calling selinux_capable(...SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) rather than
separately calling cap_capable() and task_has_perm_noaudit().

>   * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
>   * the capability is granted.
>   *

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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