From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, tgraf@infradead.org,
eugeneteo@kernel.org, kees.cook@canonical.com,
davem@davemloft.net, a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, eparis@parisplace.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2010 08:13:09 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1293023589.9820.186.camel@dan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20101222130349.GB13412@elte.hu>
> Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused by
> this?
>
> We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by
> default) - they are not worth much if they are not.
>
I agree entirely, but I've received a lot of resistance to these types
of changes in net. I'm afraid that if it's enabled by default, no one
will actually allow use of the %pK specifier where it should be used.
As far as I know, there's no actual breakage of anything in userspace,
but there's a general "it might make it harder to debug things in
certain limited circumstances" sentiment among some. I never understood
why it is necessary for unprivileged users to be able to debug the
kernel.
Does anyone else have thoughts on this?
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-12-22 13:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-12-18 21:41 [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-22 13:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2010-12-22 13:13 ` Dan Rosenberg [this message]
2010-12-22 13:48 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-12-22 13:48 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-12-22 16:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2010-12-22 20:34 ` Andrew Morton
2010-12-22 16:20 ` Ingo Molnar
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