[refpolicy] [PATCH 13/34]: patch to allow networkmanager dbus chat

[guido@trentalancia.com (Guido Trentalancia)]

On Mon, 14/03/2011 at 08.44 -0400, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 3/10/2011 4:53 PM, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
> > On Mon, 07/03/2011 at 14.37 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> >> On 03/07/11 12:09, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
> >>> On Mon, 07/03/2011 at 08.56 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> >>>> On 02/23/11 13:50, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
> >>>>> Hello Christopher !
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Wed, 23/02/2011 at 09.36 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> >>>>>> On 02/16/11 01:13, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
> >>>>>>> This patch allows dbus chat between networkmanager and dbus and
> >>>>>>> between networkmanager and xdm. It also adds a missing permission
> >>>>>>> (sysnet_read_dhcpc_state) to the networkmanager module.
> >> [cut]
> >>>>>>> diff -pruN refpolicy-git-15022011-new-before-modification/policy/modules/services/xserver.te refpolicy-git-15022011-new-modified/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
> >>>>>>> --- refpolicy-git-15022011-new-before-modification/policy/modules/services/xserver.te	2011-02-15 23:07:24.845137330 +0100
> >>>>>>> +++ refpolicy-git-15022011-new-modified/policy/modules/services/xserver.te	2011-02-15 23:17:05.369699539 +0100
> >>>>>>> @@ -548,6 +548,10 @@ optional_policy(`
> >>>>>>>   ')
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>   optional_policy(`
> >>>>>>> +	networkmanager_dbus_chat(xdm_t)
> >>>>>>> +')
> >>>>> More or less I have reported back what was being requested (in the form
> >>>>> of a patch).
> >>>> It makes me wonder if everything is running in the right domain.
> >>> That could be. But I have not been provided with a reference. So, can
> >>> you provide a reference ps auxZ which then I will compare as soon as I
> >>> can access the test system again ?
> >>
> >> It would be simpler if you could provide the ps output.  The only process that should be running in xdm_t should be xdm/gdm/kdm. If your nm-applet is running in xdm_t, it is wrong.  It should be running in the user's domain.
> >
> > Yes, I can now confirm. Everything past the X login runs in xdm_t
> > because pam_selinux open is disabled for gdm. Enabling pam_selinux open
> > for gdm leads to graphical login failures. I am trying to sort this out
> > now. Is it a known issue ?
> >
> > Do you believe such a case (gdm not using pam_selinux) should be dropped
> > and not considered as a possible scenario ?
> 
> The login application needs to set the right context for the user 
> logging in.  A login app that does not do this is malfunctioning w.r.t. 
> SELinux.  It is not a valid scenario in the policy.  I will remove the 
> xdm_t dbus access that I added from your consolekit patch, and ignore 
> the other patches that have additional xdm_t dbus permissions.

Ok, that's fine. If gdm is only supported with pam+selinux and not with
just pam, then that should be removed.

As soon as I have managed to get pam_selinux open working, I will test
and see if there is something missing.

Sorry for the misunderstanding.

Regards,

Guido