From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Yao <yffbrave@163.com>
Cc: SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: Re:Re: Re:Re: about ss
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2011 09:24:26 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1300886666.26747.15.camel@moss-pluto> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b41b75.151b.12ee0439347.Coremail.yffbrave@163.com>
On Wed, 2011-03-23 at 09:10 +0800, Yao wrote:
> Maybe I should explain. We think kernel is untrusted, ss is trusted.
> we protect the security server through gerenating a separate address
> space. When we need to use ss, we switch to this space. If untrusted
> kernel code can be executed, what we do became meaningless. That's why
> we want the ss self-contained. And our work should apply to flask
> architecture, that's why we chose selinux.
> Is it possible to fulill my goal without modifying ss excessively?
The kernel has to be trusted - it runs in ring 0.
And the security server is just a policy engine - it just provides
policy decisions to the kernel upon request. The kernel performs the
policy enforcement of those decisions.
In Fluke/Flask, the security server ran in userspace, but that was a
microkernel-based OS. And even there, we weren't trying to protect the
security server from the (micro)kernel.
It doesn't make sense to try to protect the security server apart from
the rest of the kernel.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-03-23 13:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-03-18 0:43 about ss Yao
2011-03-18 14:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2011-03-21 3:11 ` Yao
2011-03-21 8:31 ` Kohei Kaigai
2011-03-21 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2011-03-23 1:10 ` Yao
2011-03-23 13:24 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2011-03-25 6:11 ` Yao
2011-03-25 12:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2011-03-28 0:55 ` Yao
2011-03-28 12:49 ` Stephen Smalley
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