From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list linux-mips); Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:23 +0200 (CEST) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([18.85.46.34]:39022 "EHLO bombadil.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by eddie.linux-mips.org with ESMTP id S1491839Ab1EMPXS convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:18 +0200 Received: from canuck.infradead.org ([134.117.69.58]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.72 #1 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1QKuCn-0000Wn-Nt; Fri, 13 May 2011 15:23:05 +0000 Received: from j77219.upc-j.chello.nl ([24.132.77.219] helo=twins) by canuck.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.72 #1 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1QKuCm-0003aV-FW; Fri, 13 May 2011 15:23:04 +0000 Received: by twins (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 0C1DC8130A56; Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:02 +0200 (CEST) Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering From: Peter Zijlstra To: Eric Paris Cc: Ingo Molnar , James Morris , Will Drewry , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Steven Rostedt , Frederic Weisbecker , kees.cook@canonical.com, agl@chromium.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" , Ingo Molnar , Andrew Morton , Tejun Heo , Michal Marek , Oleg Nesterov , Jiri Slaby , David Howells , Russell King , Michal Simek , Ralf Baechle , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Martin Schwidefsky , Heiko Carstens , linux390@de.ibm.com, Paul Mundt , "David S. Miller" , Thomas Gleixner , "H. Peter Anvin" , x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds In-Reply-To: <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1304017638.18763.205.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1305169376-2363-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20110512074850.GA9937@elte.hu> <20110512130104.GA2912@elte.hu> <20110513121034.GG21022@elte.hu> <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Date: Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:01 +0200 Message-ID: <1305300181.2466.72.camel@twins> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.30.3 Return-Path: X-Envelope-To: <"|/home/ecartis/ecartis -s linux-mips"> (uid 0) X-Orcpt: rfc822;linux-mips@linux-mips.org Original-Recipient: rfc822;linux-mips@linux-mips.org X-archive-position: 29996 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: linux-mips-bounce@linux-mips.org Errors-to: linux-mips-bounce@linux-mips.org X-original-sender: peterz@infradead.org Precedence: bulk X-list: linux-mips On Fri, 2011-05-13 at 11:10 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: > Then again, I certainly don't see a > reason that this syscall hardening patch should be held up while a whole > new concept in computer security is contemplated... Which makes me wonder why this syscall hardening stuff is done outside of LSM? Why isn't is part of the LSM so that say SELinux can have a syscall bitmask per security context? Making it part of the LSM also avoids having to add this prctl(). From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [18.85.46.34]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B372B6EFF for ; Sat, 14 May 2011 01:23:24 +1000 (EST) Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering From: Peter Zijlstra To: Eric Paris In-Reply-To: <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1304017638.18763.205.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1305169376-2363-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20110512074850.GA9937@elte.hu> <20110512130104.GA2912@elte.hu> <20110513121034.GG21022@elte.hu> <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Date: Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:01 +0200 Message-ID: <1305300181.2466.72.camel@twins> Mime-Version: 1.0 Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, Frederic Weisbecker , Heiko Carstens , Oleg Nesterov , David Howells , Paul Mackerras , "H. Peter Anvin" , sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Jiri Slaby , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Russell King , x86@kernel.org, James Morris , Linus Torvalds , Ingo Molnar , Ingo Molnar , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Steven Rostedt , Tejun Heo , Thomas Gleixner , kees.cook@canonical.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Michal Marek , Michal Simek , Will Drewry , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ralf Baechle , Paul Mundt , Martin Schwidefsky , linux390@de.ibm.com, Andrew Morton , agl@chromium.org, "David S. Miller" List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Fri, 2011-05-13 at 11:10 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: > Then again, I certainly don't see a > reason that this syscall hardening patch should be held up while a whole > new concept in computer security is contemplated...=20 Which makes me wonder why this syscall hardening stuff is done outside of LSM? Why isn't is part of the LSM so that say SELinux can have a syscall bitmask per security context? Making it part of the LSM also avoids having to add this prctl(). From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: peterz@infradead.org (Peter Zijlstra) Date: Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering In-Reply-To: <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1304017638.18763.205.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1305169376-2363-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20110512074850.GA9937@elte.hu> <20110512130104.GA2912@elte.hu> <20110513121034.GG21022@elte.hu> <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <1305300181.2466.72.camel@twins> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org On Fri, 2011-05-13 at 11:10 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: > Then again, I certainly don't see a > reason that this syscall hardening patch should be held up while a whole > new concept in computer security is contemplated... Which makes me wonder why this syscall hardening stuff is done outside of LSM? Why isn't is part of the LSM so that say SELinux can have a syscall bitmask per security context? Making it part of the LSM also avoids having to add this prctl().