From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: trond.myklebust@netapp.com, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nfs: fix regression in handling of context= option in NFSv4
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 15:13:05 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1324325585.22363.16.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1324324223-9933-1-git-send-email-jlayton@redhat.com>
On Mon, 2011-12-19 at 14:50 -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> Setting the security context of a NFSv4 mount via the context= mount
> option is currently broken. The NFSv4 codepath allocates a parsed
> options struct, and then parses the mount options to fill it. It
> eventually calls nfs4_remote_mount which calls security_init_mnt_opts.
> That clobbers the lsm_opts struct that was populated earlier. This bug
> also looks like it causes a small memory leak on each v4 mount where
> context= is used.
>
> Fix this by moving the initialization of the lsm_opts into
> nfs_alloc_parsed_mount_data, and the freeing of the same into the
> functions that allocate the nfs_parsed_mount_data.
I think this is a good lifetime, but I don't think we have it quite
right.
> @@ -2222,8 +2223,6 @@ static struct dentry *nfs_fs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
> if (data == NULL || mntfh == NULL)
> goto out_free_fh;
Lets assume we allocated data, but failed on mntfh. We are going to
have called security_init_mnt_opts() but never have called the
corresponding destructor. True, it'll be fine today with selinux, but I
make no promises what the future holds...
I'm pretty sure the v4 code has the same issue. Maybe you should write
an explicit nfs_free_parsed_mount_data() function to handle all of the
error paths in v3 and v4? Just a suggestion....
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-12-19 20:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-12-19 19:50 [PATCH] nfs: fix regression in handling of context= option in NFSv4 Jeff Layton
2011-12-19 20:13 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2011-12-20 20:23 ` Jeff Layton
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2011-12-20 11:57 Jeff Layton
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1324325585.22363.16.camel@localhost \
--to=eparis@redhat.com \
--cc=jlayton@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=trond.myklebust@netapp.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.