From: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
djm@mindrot.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, luto@mit.edu, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com,
daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, indan@nul.nu, mcgrathr@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2012 19:21:09 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1327749669.15441.9.camel@cr0> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1327706681-11959-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
On Fri, 2012-01-27 at 17:24 -0600, Will Drewry wrote:
> +config SECCOMP_FILTER
> + bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering"
> + select SECCOMP
Is 'depends on SECCOMP' better?
> + help
> + This option provide support for limiting the accessibility
> of
s/provide/provides/
> + systems calls at a task-level using a dynamically defined
> policy.
s/systems/system/
> +
> + System call filtering policy is expressed by the user using
> + a Berkeley Packet Filter program. The program is attached
> using
s/the user using//
> + prctl(2). For every system call the task makes, its number,
> + arguments, and other metadata will be evaluated by the
> attached
> + filter program. The result determines if the system call
> may
> + may proceed or if the task should be terminated.
One more "may"... and "be proceeded"
> +
> + This behavior is meant to aid security-conscious software in
> + its ability to minimize the risk of running potentially
> + risky code.
> +
> + See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail.
> +
Thanks.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-28 11:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-27 23:24 [PATCH v5 1/3] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-01-27 23:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-28 11:21 ` Cong Wang [this message]
2012-01-28 20:13 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28 20:13 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28 16:28 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-28 16:28 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-28 19:50 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28 19:50 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-29 4:39 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-29 20:27 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-29 20:27 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 2:37 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-30 22:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:29 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:42 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:42 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:59 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-31 1:42 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-31 11:04 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-31 15:18 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-31 15:18 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-01 1:36 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-01 1:36 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-01 9:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-01 9:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-01 10:56 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-01 17:34 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-27 23:24 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-01-27 23:41 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Greg KH
2012-01-27 23:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-27 23:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28 0:38 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-28 11:13 ` Cong Wang
2012-01-28 21:06 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28 21:06 ` Will Drewry
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