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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: Force avc_has_perm to return success if enforcing == 0;
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 15:37:59 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1329856679.12501.81.camel@moss-pluto> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4F3D14B3.9090502@redhat.com>

On Thu, 2012-02-16 at 09:37 -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> On 02/16/2012 09:25 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2012-02-14 at 16:22 -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
> >> 
> >> I would like to patch libselinux to always return 0 on
> >> avc_has_perm if the machine is in permissive mode.
> >> 
> >> This will allow Userspace Object Managers to work even if the
> >> system is totally mislabeled and processes as running with bad
> >> context. Currently if a program like dbus asks with a bad process
> >> label it can get denials even in permissive mode.
> >> 
> >> Does anyone see a problem with this?
> > 
> > I'm not fond of it.  Permissive mode is just supposed to control
> > whether permission is granted, not to hide other kinds of errors.
> > Consider how difficult debugging of an actual failure will be if it
> > only shows up in enforcing mode even though it has nothing to do
> > with policy.
> > 
> Well I guess I can only due the return in the audit_has_perm not the
> audit_has_perm_noaudit, since then the audit message will get
> generated but dbus,passwd,xserver ... will allow the access.
> 
> If an app calls audit_has_perm_noaudit, it will still return failure.

That doesn't help.  The issue is that avc_has_perm can fail for reasons
other than permission failure (which is why you are making this change),
but those other reasons are not logged/audited, so if you make them
succeed in permissive mode, then they won't be seen there.  At all.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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  reply	other threads:[~2012-02-21 20:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-02-14 21:22 Force avc_has_perm to return success if enforcing == 0; Daniel J Walsh
2012-02-16 14:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2012-02-16 14:37   ` Daniel J Walsh
2012-02-21 20:37     ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2012-02-16 15:18 ` Colin Walters
     [not found] <CAPzO=Nw+T8_QkzHPboQ-s399hmdMF0jb0_3ipSrSyqpHztfOfg@mail.gmail.com>
2012-02-15 15:25 ` Daniel J Walsh

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