From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be, David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Martin Topholm <mph@hoth.dk>, netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] tcp: Fast/early SYN handling to mitigate SYN floods
Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 19:21:05 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1337880065.2388.15.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1337871077.3140.12.camel@edumazet-glaptop>
On Thu, 2012-05-24 at 16:51 +0200, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Thu, 2012-05-24 at 15:26 +0200, Christoph Paasch wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > On 05/24/2012 03:01 PM, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:
> > > I have been doing some TCP performance measurements with SYN flooding,
> > > and have found that, we don't handle this case well.
> > >
> > > I have made a patch for fast/early SYN handling in tcp_v4_rcv() in
> > > net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c. This increases SYN performance from 130 kpps to
> > > 750 kpps (max of the generator), with idle CPU cycles.
> > >
> > > Current locking:
> > > During a SYN flood (against a single port) all CPUs are spinning on
> > > the same spinlock, namely bh_lock_sock_nested(sk), in tcp_ipv4.c. The
> > > lock dates back to a commit by DaveM in May 1999, see historic
> > > commit[1]. It seem that TCP runs fully locked, per sock.
> > >
> > > I need some help with locking, as the patch seems to work fine, with
> > > NO-PREEMPT, but with PREEMPT enabled I start to see warnings (in
> > > reqsk_queue_destroy) and oopses (in inet_csk_reqsk_queue_prune).
> > >
> > > What am I missing?
> >
> > For each retransmission of a SYN you will add a request-sock to the
> > syn_table, because you do not pass by tcp_v4_hnd_req(), which checks
> > this by calling inet_csk_search_req().
Thanks that's good hint. I was suspecting that tcp_v4_hnd_req() was
somehow needed (as noted in the comment in the patch)
> > And your warning in reqsk_queue_destroy is because the access to the the
> > request_sock_queue is no more protected by a lock.
Yes, I was suspecting that.
> > The request_sock_queue is a shared resource, which must be protect by a
> > lock. As you allow "parallel" SYN-processing, the queue will get corrupted.
> >
>
> Hi guys, that's a very interesting subject.
>
> I began work on fully converting this stuff to RCU some weeks ago but
> got distracted by codel / fq_codel and other cool stuff (TCP coalescing
> and skb->frag_head)
>
> I dont know if you remember the SO_REUSEPORT patch(s) posted by Tom
> Herbert in the past. The remaining issue was about adding/removing a new
> listener to a pool of listeners to same port, and hash function was
> changed so we could lost some connexions in SYN_RECV state at this
> stage.
Sorry, don't remember.
> So I was working having a shared table, and not anymore using a central
> spinlock, but an array of spinlock, as done elsewhere
> (ESTABLISHED/TIMEWAIT hash tables)
>
> My work is probably a ~500 LOC target, allowing concurrent processing by
> all cpus of the host.
Sounds really promising, especially coming from the network-ninja :-)
> Jesper, my goals are probably different than yours, unless I
> misunderstood your intention.
>
> I feel you want to have an emergency mode, when listener is overflowed
> to immediately send a SYNCOOKIE ?
Yes, this is more an emergency mode.
I was thinking of only handling the SYN cookie case in parallel.
That should be easier locking wise, right.
I'm also considering writing a netfilter/iptables syn-cookie module, as
this would allow people to use it in combination with IPset, to e.g
create a whitelist feature of known-good-hosts (which have completed the
TCP handshake). But it would be nicer if the base kernel was just fast
enough to handle these SYN floods.
--
Best regards,
Jesper Dangaard Brouer
MSc.CS, Sr. Network Kernel Developer at Red Hat
Author of http://www.iptv-analyzer.org
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/brouer
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-05-24 17:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-05-24 13:01 [RFC PATCH] tcp: Fast/early SYN handling to mitigate SYN floods Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2012-05-24 13:20 ` Hans Schillstrom
2012-05-24 17:32 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2012-05-24 13:26 ` Christoph Paasch
2012-05-24 14:51 ` Eric Dumazet
2012-05-24 17:21 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer [this message]
2012-05-24 17:27 ` Eric Dumazet
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