Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

[Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>]

On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 19:13 +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 31, 2012 at 09:27:14AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote:
> > On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 14:14 +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote:
> > > On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote:
> > > > On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote:
> > > > > The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because
> > > > > a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow mmap_min_addr.
> > > > 
> > > > NAK
> > > 
> > > Currently prctl(PR_SET_MM_*, addr, ) returns EINVAL for valid addresses.
> > > I think it's a bug. Are you agree?
> > 
> > Can you help me understand how prctl(PR_SET_MM_*, relates to
> > checkpoint/restore?  My worry here is that somehow this interface could
> 
> Here how we use it (from userspace code)
> 
> 	ret |= sys_prctl_safe(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_START_CODE, (long)args->mm.mm_start_code, 0);
> 	ret |= sys_prctl_safe(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_END_CODE, (long)args->mm.mm_end_code, 0);
> 	...
> 
> the values of mm.mm_start_code and such are saved in image file and obtained
> during checkpoint stage. Note the prctl_set_mm requires the caller to have
> CAP_SYS_RESOURCE privilege granted.

Is there anything which prevents an unpriv application from changing
mm.mm_start_code and mm.mm_end_code in the image, thus taking advantage
of the privileged restore code to bypass the mmap_min_addr
restrictions?