From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] kexec: add infrastructure for handling kexec images
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 17:48:10 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1361468894-18655-5-git-send-email-david.vrabel@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1361468894-18655-1-git-send-email-david.vrabel@citrix.com>
From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Add the code needed to handle and load kexec images into Xen memory or
into the crash region. This is needed for the new KEXEC_CMD_load and
KEXEC_CMD_unload hypercall sub-ops.
Much of this code is derived from the Linux kernel.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
---
xen/common/Makefile | 1 +
xen/common/kimage.c | 887 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/kimage.h | 64 ++++
3 files changed, 952 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 xen/common/kimage.c
create mode 100644 xen/include/xen/kimage.h
diff --git a/xen/common/Makefile b/xen/common/Makefile
index 1677342..4c04018 100644
--- a/xen/common/Makefile
+++ b/xen/common/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-y += irq.o
obj-y += kernel.o
obj-y += keyhandler.o
obj-$(HAS_KEXEC) += kexec.o
+obj-$(HAS_KEXEC) += kimage.o
obj-y += lib.o
obj-y += memory.o
obj-y += multicall.o
diff --git a/xen/common/kimage.c b/xen/common/kimage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5f07c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/common/kimage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+/*
+ * Kexec Image
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Citrix Systems R&D Ltd.
+ *
+ * Derived from kernel/kexec.c from Linux:
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#include <xen/config.h>
+#include <xen/types.h>
+#include <xen/init.h>
+#include <xen/kernel.h>
+#include <xen/errno.h>
+#include <xen/spinlock.h>
+#include <xen/guest_access.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
+#include <xen/kexec.h>
+#include <xen/kimage.h>
+
+#include <asm/page.h>
+
+/*
+ * When kexec transitions to the new kernel there is a one-to-one
+ * mapping between physical and virtual addresses. On processors
+ * where you can disable the MMU this is trivial, and easy. For
+ * others it is still a simple predictable page table to setup.
+ *
+ * In that environment kexec copies the new kernel to its final
+ * resting place. This means I can only support memory whose
+ * physical address can fit in an unsigned long. In particular
+ * addresses where (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) > ULONG_MAX cannot be handled.
+ * If the assembly stub has more restrictive requirements
+ * KEXEC_SOURCE_MEMORY_LIMIT and KEXEC_DEST_MEMORY_LIMIT can be
+ * defined more restrictively in <asm/kexec.h>.
+ *
+ * The code for the transition from the current kernel to the
+ * the new kernel is placed in the control_code_buffer, whose size
+ * is given by KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE. In the best case only a single
+ * page of memory is necessary, but some architectures require more.
+ * Because this memory must be identity mapped in the transition from
+ * virtual to physical addresses it must live in the range
+ * 0 - TASK_SIZE, as only the user space mappings are arbitrarily
+ * modifiable.
+ *
+ * The assembly stub in the control code buffer is passed a linked list
+ * of descriptor pages detailing the source pages of the new kernel,
+ * and the destination addresses of those source pages. As this data
+ * structure is not used in the context of the current OS, it must
+ * be self-contained.
+ *
+ * The code has been made to work with highmem pages and will use a
+ * destination page in its final resting place (if it happens
+ * to allocate it). The end product of this is that most of the
+ * physical address space, and most of RAM can be used.
+ *
+ * Future directions include:
+ * - allocating a page table with the control code buffer identity
+ * mapped, to simplify machine_kexec and make kexec_on_panic more
+ * reliable.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * KIMAGE_NO_DEST is an impossible destination address..., for
+ * allocating pages whose destination address we do not care about.
+ */
+#define KIMAGE_NO_DEST (-1UL)
+
+static int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_page(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned long dest);
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_xen_page(void)
+{
+ void *p;
+
+ p = alloc_xenheap_page();
+ if ( p == NULL )
+ return NULL;
+ return virt_to_page(p);
+}
+
+static void kimage_free_xen_page(struct page_info *page)
+{
+ free_xenheap_page(page_to_virt(page));
+}
+
+static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, unsigned long entry,
+ unsigned long nr_segments,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments)
+{
+ struct kexec_image *image;
+ unsigned long i;
+ int result;
+
+ /* Allocate a controlling structure */
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ image = xzalloc(typeof(*image));
+ if ( !image )
+ goto out;
+
+ image->head = 0;
+ image->entry = &image->head;
+ image->last_entry = &image->head;
+ image->control_page = ~0; /* By default this does not apply */
+ image->entry_maddr = entry;
+ image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT;
+ image->nr_segments = nr_segments;
+ image->segments = segments;
+
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&image->control_pages);
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&image->dest_pages);
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&image->unuseable_pages);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify we have good destination addresses. The caller is
+ * responsible for making certain we don't attempt to load
+ * the new image into invalid or reserved areas of RAM. This
+ * just verifies it is an address we can use.
+ *
+ * Since the kernel does everything in page size chunks ensure
+ * the destination addresses are page aligned. Too many
+ * special cases crop of when we don't do this. The most
+ * insidious is getting overlapping destination addresses
+ * simply because addresses are changed to page size
+ * granularity.
+ */
+ result = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
+ if ( (mstart & ~PAGE_MASK) || (mend & ~PAGE_MASK) )
+ goto out;
+ if ( mend >= KEXEC_DESTINATION_MEMORY_LIMIT )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify our destination addresses do not overlap.
+ * If we alloed overlapping destination addresses
+ * through very weird things can happen with no
+ * easy explanation as one segment stops on another.
+ */
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ unsigned long mstart, mend;
+ unsigned long j;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++ )
+ {
+ unsigned long pstart, pend;
+ pstart = image->segments[j].dest_maddr;
+ pend = pstart + image->segments[j].dest_size;
+ /* Do the segments overlap ? */
+ if ( (mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend) )
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure our buffer sizes are strictly less than
+ * our memory sizes. This should always be the case,
+ * and it is easier to check up front than to be surprised
+ * later on.
+ */
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( image->segments[i].buf_size > image->segments[i].dest_size )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ result = 0;
+out:
+ if ( result == 0 )
+ *rimage = image;
+ else
+ kimage_free(image);
+
+ return result;
+
+}
+
+static int kimage_normal_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, unsigned long entry,
+ unsigned long nr_segments,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments)
+{
+ int result;
+ struct kexec_image *image;
+ void *code_page;
+
+ /* Allocate and initialize a controlling structure */
+ image = NULL;
+ result = do_kimage_alloc(&image, entry, nr_segments, segments);
+ if ( result )
+ goto out;
+
+ *rimage = image;
+
+ /*
+ * The control code page must still be accessible after the
+ * processor has switched to 32-bit mode.
+ */
+ code_page = alloc_xenheap_pages(0, MEMF_bits(32));
+ if ( code_page == NULL )
+ {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Could not allocate control_code_buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ image->control_code_page = virt_to_page(code_page);
+
+ result = 0;
+out:
+ if ( result == 0 )
+ *rimage = image;
+ else
+ xfree(image);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int kimage_crash_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, unsigned long entry,
+ unsigned long nr_segments,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments)
+{
+ int result;
+ struct kexec_image *image;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ image = NULL;
+ /* Verify we have a valid entry point */
+ if ( (entry < kexec_crash_area.start)
+ || (entry > kexec_crash_area.start + kexec_crash_area.size))
+ {
+ result = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate and initialize a controlling structure */
+ result = do_kimage_alloc(&image, entry, nr_segments, segments);
+ if ( result )
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Enable the special crash kernel control page
+ * allocation policy.
+ */
+ image->control_page = kexec_crash_area.start;
+ image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify we have good destination addresses. Normally
+ * the caller is responsible for making certain we don't
+ * attempt to load the new image into invalid or reserved
+ * areas of RAM. But crash kernels are preloaded into a
+ * reserved area of ram. We must ensure the addresses
+ * are in the reserved area otherwise preloading the
+ * kernel could corrupt things.
+ */
+ result = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size - 1;
+ /* Ensure we are within the crash kernel limits */
+ if ( (mstart < kexec_crash_area.start )
+ || (mend > kexec_crash_area.start + kexec_crash_area.size))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find a location for the control code buffer, and add
+ * the vector of segments so that it's pages will also be
+ * counted as destination pages.
+ */
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ image->control_code_page = kimage_alloc_control_page(image);
+ if ( !image->control_code_page )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Could not allocate control_code_buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ result = 0;
+out:
+ if ( result == 0 )
+ *rimage = image;
+ else
+ xfree(image);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end)
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
+ if ( (end > mstart) && (start < mend) )
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void kimage_free_page_list(struct page_list_head *list)
+{
+ struct page_info *page, *next;
+
+ page_list_for_each_safe(page, next, list)
+ {
+ printk("delete page %p\n", page);
+ page_list_del(page, list);
+ kimage_free_xen_page(page);
+ }
+}
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_normal_control_page(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ /* Control pages are special, they are the intermediaries
+ * that are needed while we copy the rest of the pages
+ * to their final resting place. As such they must
+ * not conflict with either the destination addresses
+ * or memory the kernel is already using.
+ *
+ * The only case where we really need more than one of
+ * these are for architectures where we cannot disable
+ * the MMU and must instead generate an identity mapped
+ * page table for all of the memory.
+ *
+ * At worst this runs in O(N) of the image size.
+ */
+ struct page_list_head extra_pages;
+ struct page_info *page = NULL;
+
+ INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&extra_pages);
+
+ /* Loop while I can allocate a page and the page allocated
+ * is a destination page.
+ */
+ do {
+ unsigned long mfn, emfn, addr, eaddr;
+
+ page = kimage_alloc_xen_page();
+ if ( !page )
+ break;
+ mfn = page_to_mfn(page);
+ emfn = mfn + 1;
+ addr = mfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ eaddr = emfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if ( (emfn >= (KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT >> PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
+ kimage_is_destination_range(image, addr, eaddr) )
+ {
+ printk("add page %p\n", page);
+ page_list_add(page, &extra_pages);
+ page = NULL;
+ }
+ } while ( !page );
+
+ if ( page )
+ {
+ /* Remember the allocated page... */
+ page_list_add(page, &image->control_pages);
+
+ /* Because the page is already in it's destination
+ * location we will never allocate another page at
+ * that address. Therefore kimage_alloc_page
+ * will not return it (again) and we don't need
+ * to give it an entry in image->segments[].
+ */
+ }
+ /* Deal with the destination pages I have inadvertently allocated.
+ *
+ * Ideally I would convert multi-page allocations into single
+ * page allocations, and add everything to image->dest_pages.
+ *
+ * For now it is simpler to just free the pages.
+ */
+ kimage_free_page_list(&extra_pages);
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_crash_control_page(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ /* Control pages are special, they are the intermediaries
+ * that are needed while we copy the rest of the pages
+ * to their final resting place. As such they must
+ * not conflict with either the destination addresses
+ * or memory the kernel is already using.
+ *
+ * Control pages are also the only pags we must allocate
+ * when loading a crash kernel. All of the other pages
+ * are specified by the segments and we just memcpy
+ * into them directly.
+ *
+ * The only case where we really need more than one of
+ * these are for architectures where we cannot disable
+ * the MMU and must instead generate an identity mapped
+ * page table for all of the memory.
+ *
+ * Given the low demand this implements a very simple
+ * allocator that finds the first hole of the appropriate
+ * size in the reserved memory region, and allocates all
+ * of the memory up to and including the hole.
+ */
+ unsigned long hole_start, hole_end, size;
+ struct page_info *page;
+
+ page = NULL;
+ size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ hole_start = (image->control_page + (size - 1)) & ~(size - 1);
+ hole_end = hole_start + size - 1;
+ while ( hole_end <= kexec_crash_area.start + kexec_crash_area.size )
+ {
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ if ( hole_end > KEXEC_CRASH_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT )
+ break;
+ if ( hole_end > kexec_crash_area.start + kexec_crash_area.size )
+ break;
+ /* See if I overlap any of the segments */
+ for ( i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++ )
+ {
+ unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+ mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
+ mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size - 1;
+ if ( (hole_end >= mstart) && (hole_start <= mend) )
+ {
+ /* Advance the hole to the end of the segment */
+ hole_start = (mend + (size - 1)) & ~(size - 1);
+ hole_end = hole_start + size - 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If I don't overlap any segments I have found my hole! */
+ if ( i == image->nr_segments )
+ {
+ page = mfn_to_page(hole_start >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if ( page )
+ image->control_page = hole_end;
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+
+struct page_info *kimage_alloc_control_page(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ struct page_info *pages = NULL;
+
+ switch ( image->type )
+ {
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+ pages = kimage_alloc_normal_control_page(image);
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
+ pages = kimage_alloc_crash_control_page(image);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ( pages )
+ clear_page(page_to_virt(pages));
+
+ return pages;
+}
+
+static int kimage_add_entry(struct kexec_image *image, kimage_entry_t entry)
+{
+ if ( *image->entry != 0 )
+ image->entry++;
+
+ if ( image->entry == image->last_entry )
+ {
+ kimage_entry_t *ind_page;
+ struct page_info *page;
+
+ page = kimage_alloc_page(image, KIMAGE_NO_DEST);
+ if ( !page )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ind_page = page_to_virt(page);
+ *image->entry = page_to_maddr(page) | IND_INDIRECTION;
+ image->entry = ind_page;
+ image->last_entry = ind_page +
+ ((PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(kimage_entry_t)) - 1);
+ }
+ *image->entry = entry;
+ image->entry++;
+ *image->entry = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kimage_set_destination(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned long destination)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ destination &= PAGE_MASK;
+ result = kimage_add_entry(image, destination | IND_DESTINATION);
+ if ( result == 0 )
+ image->destination = destination;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+static int kimage_add_page(struct kexec_image *image, unsigned long page)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ page &= PAGE_MASK;
+ result = kimage_add_entry(image, page | IND_SOURCE);
+ if ( result == 0 )
+ image->destination += PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+static void kimage_free_extra_pages(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ kimage_free_page_list(&image->dest_pages);
+ kimage_free_page_list(&image->unuseable_pages);
+
+}
+
+static void kimage_terminate(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ if ( *image->entry != 0 )
+ image->entry++;
+
+ *image->entry = IND_DONE;
+}
+
+#define for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry) \
+ for ( ptr = &image->head; (entry = *ptr) && !(entry & IND_DONE ); \
+ ptr = (entry & IND_INDIRECTION) ? \
+ maddr_to_virt((entry & PAGE_MASK)) : ptr + 1)
+
+static void kimage_free_entry(kimage_entry_t entry)
+{
+ struct page_info *page;
+
+ page = mfn_to_page(entry >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ kimage_free_xen_page(page);
+}
+
+void kimage_free(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
+ kimage_entry_t ind = 0;
+
+ if ( !image )
+ return;
+
+ kimage_free_extra_pages(image);
+ for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry)
+ {
+ if ( entry & IND_INDIRECTION )
+ {
+ /* Free the previous indirection page */
+ if ( ind & IND_INDIRECTION )
+ kimage_free_entry(ind);
+ /* Save this indirection page until we are
+ * done with it.
+ */
+ ind = entry;
+ }
+ else if ( entry & IND_SOURCE )
+ kimage_free_entry(entry);
+ }
+ /* Free the final indirection page */
+ if ( ind & IND_INDIRECTION )
+ kimage_free_entry(ind);
+
+ /* Free the kexec control pages... */
+ kimage_free_page_list(&image->control_pages);
+ xfree(image->segments);
+ xfree(image);
+}
+
+static kimage_entry_t *kimage_dst_used(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned long page)
+{
+ kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
+ unsigned long destination = 0;
+
+ for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry)
+ {
+ if ( entry & IND_DESTINATION )
+ destination = entry & PAGE_MASK;
+ else if ( entry & IND_SOURCE )
+ {
+ if ( page == destination )
+ return ptr;
+ destination += PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct page_info *kimage_alloc_page(struct kexec_image *image,
+ unsigned long destination)
+{
+ /*
+ * Here we implement safeguards to ensure that a source page
+ * is not copied to its destination page before the data on
+ * the destination page is no longer useful.
+ *
+ * To do this we maintain the invariant that a source page is
+ * either its own destination page, or it is not a
+ * destination page at all.
+ *
+ * That is slightly stronger than required, but the proof
+ * that no problems will not occur is trivial, and the
+ * implementation is simply to verify.
+ *
+ * When allocating all pages normally this algorithm will run
+ * in O(N) time, but in the worst case it will run in O(N^2)
+ * time. If the runtime is a problem the data structures can
+ * be fixed.
+ */
+ struct page_info *page;
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Walk through the list of destination pages, and see if I
+ * have a match.
+ */
+ page_list_for_each(page, &image->dest_pages)
+ {
+ addr = page_to_mfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if ( addr == destination )
+ {
+ page_list_del(page, &image->dest_pages);
+ return page;
+ }
+ }
+ page = NULL;
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ kimage_entry_t *old;
+
+ /* Allocate a page, if we run out of memory give up */
+ page = kimage_alloc_xen_page();
+ if ( !page )
+ return NULL;
+ /* If the page cannot be used file it away */
+ if ( page_to_mfn(page) >
+ (KEXEC_SOURCE_MEMORY_LIMIT >> PAGE_SHIFT) )
+ {
+ page_list_add(page, &image->unuseable_pages);
+ continue;
+ }
+ addr = page_to_mfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ /* If it is the destination page we want use it */
+ if ( addr == destination )
+ break;
+
+ /* If the page is not a destination page use it */
+ if ( !kimage_is_destination_range(image, addr,
+ addr + PAGE_SIZE) )
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * I know that the page is someones destination page.
+ * See if there is already a source page for this
+ * destination page. And if so swap the source pages.
+ */
+ old = kimage_dst_used(image, addr);
+ if ( old )
+ {
+ /* If so move it */
+ unsigned long old_addr;
+ struct page_info *old_page;
+
+ old_addr = *old & PAGE_MASK;
+ old_page = mfn_to_page(old_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ copy_page(page, old_page);
+ *old = addr | (*old & ~PAGE_MASK);
+
+ addr = old_addr;
+ page = old_page;
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Place the page on the destination list I
+ * will use it later.
+ */
+ page_list_add(page, &image->dest_pages);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+static int kimage_load_normal_segment(struct kexec_image *image,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segment)
+{
+ unsigned long to_copy;
+ unsigned long src_offset;
+ unsigned long dest;
+ int ret;
+
+ to_copy = segment->buf_size;
+ src_offset = 0;
+ dest = segment->dest_maddr;
+
+ ret = kimage_set_destination(image, dest);
+ if ( ret < 0 )
+ return ret;
+
+ while ( to_copy )
+ {
+ unsigned long dest_mfn;
+ size_t dest_off;
+ struct page_info *page;
+ void *dest_va;
+ size_t size;
+
+ dest_mfn = dest >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ dest_off = dest & ~PAGE_MASK;
+
+ size = min(PAGE_SIZE - dest_off, to_copy);
+
+ page = kimage_alloc_page(image, dest);
+ if ( !page )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = kimage_add_page(image, page_to_mfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ if ( ret < 0 )
+ return ret;
+
+ dest_va = page_to_virt(page);
+ clear_page(dest_va);
+ ret = copy_from_guest_offset(dest_va + dest_off, segment->buf, src_offset, size);
+ if ( ret )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ to_copy -= size;
+ src_offset += size;
+ dest += size;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kimage_load_crash_segment(struct kexec_image *image,
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segment)
+{
+ /* For crash dumps kernels we simply copy the data from
+ * user space to it's destination.
+ * We do things a page at a time for the sake of kmap.
+ */
+ unsigned long dest;
+ unsigned long sbytes, dbytes;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long src_offset = 0;
+
+ sbytes = segment->buf_size;
+ dbytes = segment->dest_size;
+ dest = segment->dest_maddr;
+
+ while ( dbytes )
+ {
+ unsigned long dest_mfn;
+ size_t dest_off;
+ void *dest_va;
+ size_t schunk, dchunk;
+
+ dest_mfn = dest >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ dest_off = dest & ~PAGE_MASK;
+
+ dchunk = min(PAGE_SIZE - dest_off, dbytes);
+ schunk = min(dchunk, sbytes);
+
+ dest_va = vmap(&dest_mfn, 1);
+ if ( dest_va == NULL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = copy_from_guest_offset(dest_va + dest_off, segment->buf, src_offset, schunk);
+ memset(dest_va + dest_off + schunk, 0, dchunk - schunk);
+
+ vunmap(dest_va);
+ if ( ret )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ dbytes -= dchunk;
+ sbytes -= schunk;
+ dest += dchunk;
+ src_offset += schunk;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kimage_load_segment(struct kexec_image *image, xen_kexec_segment_t *segment)
+{
+ int result = -ENOMEM;
+
+ switch ( image->type )
+ {
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+ result = kimage_load_normal_segment(image, segment);
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
+ result = kimage_load_crash_segment(image, segment);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+int kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, uint8_t type, uint16_t arch,
+ uint64_t entry_maddr,
+ uint32_t nr_segments, xen_kexec_segment_t *segment)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ switch( type )
+ {
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+ result = kimage_normal_alloc(rimage, entry_maddr, nr_segments, segment);
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
+ result = kimage_crash_alloc(rimage, entry_maddr, nr_segments, segment);
+ break;
+ default:
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ( result < 0 )
+ return result;
+
+ (*rimage)->arch = arch;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+int kimage_load_segments(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ int s;
+ int result;
+
+ for ( s = 0; s < image->nr_segments; s++ ) {
+ result = kimage_load_segment(image, &image->segments[s]);
+ if ( result < 0 )
+ return result;
+ }
+ kimage_terminate(image);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/kimage.h b/xen/include/xen/kimage.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc71b87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/include/xen/kimage.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#ifndef __XEN_KIMAGE_H__
+#define __XEN_KIMAGE_H__
+
+#include <xen/list.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
+#include <public/kexec.h>
+
+#define KEXEC_DESTINATION_MEMORY_LIMIT (~0ul)
+#define KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT (~0ul)
+#define KEXEC_CRASH_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT (~0ul)
+#define KEXEC_SOURCE_MEMORY_LIMIT (~0ul)
+
+#define KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+
+#define KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX 16
+
+typedef unsigned long kimage_entry_t;
+#define IND_DESTINATION 0x1
+#define IND_INDIRECTION 0x2
+#define IND_DONE 0x4
+#define IND_SOURCE 0x8
+
+struct kexec_image {
+ uint8_t type;
+ uint16_t arch;
+ uint64_t entry_maddr;
+ uint32_t nr_segments;
+ xen_kexec_segment_t *segments;
+
+ kimage_entry_t head;
+ kimage_entry_t *entry;
+ kimage_entry_t *last_entry;
+
+ unsigned long destination;
+
+ struct page_info *control_code_page;
+ struct page_info *aux_page;
+
+ struct page_list_head control_pages;
+ struct page_list_head dest_pages;
+ struct page_list_head unuseable_pages;
+
+ /* Address of next control page to allocate for crash kernels. */
+ unsigned long control_page;
+};
+
+int kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, uint8_t type, uint16_t arch,
+ uint64_t entry_maddr,
+ uint32_t nr_segments, xen_kexec_segment_t *segment);
+void kimage_free(struct kexec_image *image);
+int kimage_load_segments(struct kexec_image *image);
+struct page_info *kimage_alloc_control_page(struct kexec_image *image);
+
+#endif /* __XEN_KIMAGE_H__ */
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
--
1.7.2.5
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-02-21 17:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 110+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-02-21 17:48 [PATCH 0/8] kexec: extended kexec hypercall for use with pv-ops kernels David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86: give FIX_EFI_MPF its own fixmap entry David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` [PATCH 2/8] xen: make GUEST_HANDLE_64() and uint64_aligned_t available everywhere David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` [PATCH 3/8] kexec: add public interface for improved load/unload sub-ops David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 22:29 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-02-21 22:29 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-02-22 11:49 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-22 11:49 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-22 8:33 ` Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 8:33 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 11:50 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-22 13:09 ` Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 13:09 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 11:50 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 10:50 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 10:50 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 11:52 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 12:28 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 12:28 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 12:36 ` Jan Beulich
2013-03-08 12:36 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-03-08 15:34 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 15:34 ` [Xen-devel] " Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 11:52 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel [this message]
2013-03-08 11:37 ` [PATCH 4/8] kexec: add infrastructure for handling kexec images Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 11:42 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 11:42 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 11:58 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 11:58 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 11:37 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` [PATCH 5/8] kexec: extend hypercall with improved load/unload ops David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 22:41 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-02-21 22:41 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-02-22 8:42 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 11:54 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-22 11:54 ` [Xen-devel] " David Vrabel
2013-02-22 13:11 ` Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 13:11 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 8:42 ` Jan Beulich
2013-03-08 11:23 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 11:40 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 12:21 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 14:01 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 14:01 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 15:23 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 15:23 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 17:29 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2013-03-08 17:29 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-03-08 21:45 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 21:45 ` [Xen-devel] " Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 23:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-03-08 23:38 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2013-03-11 11:17 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 13:21 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-11 13:30 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 13:30 ` [Xen-devel] " Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 13:43 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-11 13:43 ` [Xen-devel] " David Vrabel
2013-03-11 14:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 14:27 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-03-11 14:27 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2013-03-11 20:45 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 20:45 ` [Xen-devel] " Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 21:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-03-11 21:18 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2013-03-12 11:17 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-12 11:17 ` [Xen-devel] " Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 14:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-11 13:21 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-11 11:17 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 12:21 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-08 11:40 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-08 11:23 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-12 11:36 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-03-12 11:36 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-02-21 17:48 ` [PATCH 6/8] xen: kexec crash image when dom0 crashes David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` [PATCH 7/8] libxc: add hypercall buffer arrays David Vrabel
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-06 14:25 ` Ian Jackson
2013-03-06 14:25 ` [Xen-devel] " Ian Jackson
2013-03-07 2:44 ` Ian Campbell
2013-03-07 2:44 ` [Xen-devel] " Ian Campbell
2013-02-21 17:48 ` [PATCH 8/8] libxc: add API for kexec hypercall David Vrabel
2013-03-07 2:46 ` Ian Campbell
2013-03-07 2:46 ` [Xen-devel] " Ian Campbell
2013-02-21 17:48 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-21 22:47 ` [PATCH 0/8] kexec: extended kexec hypercall for use with pv-ops kernels Daniel Kiper
2013-02-21 22:47 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-02-22 8:17 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-02-22 11:56 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-22 11:56 ` David Vrabel
2013-02-22 8:17 ` Jan Beulich
2013-02-26 13:58 ` [Xen-devel] " Don Slutz
2013-02-26 13:58 ` Don Slutz
2013-03-05 11:04 ` David Vrabel
2013-03-05 11:04 ` [Xen-devel] " David Vrabel
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-04-08 18:59 [PATCHv3 0/8] kexec: extend " David Vrabel
2013-04-08 18:59 ` [PATCH 4/8] kexec: add infrastructure for handling kexec images David Vrabel
2013-04-08 18:59 ` David Vrabel
2013-04-09 7:44 ` Jan Beulich
2013-04-09 7:44 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-04-09 16:17 ` David Vrabel
2013-04-10 8:36 ` Jan Beulich
2013-04-09 16:17 ` David Vrabel
2013-04-16 17:13 [PATCHv4 0/8] kexec: extend kexec hypercall for use with pv-ops kernels David Vrabel
2013-04-16 17:13 ` [PATCH 4/8] kexec: add infrastructure for handling kexec images David Vrabel
2013-04-16 17:13 ` David Vrabel
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