From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org>
To: Matthias Schniedermeyer <ms@citd.de>
Cc: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] SSD disks and cryptsetup-reencrypt
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2013 07:51:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1371102701.4059.14.camel@scapa> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130612234322.GA21746@citd.de>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2105 bytes --]
On jeu., 2013-06-13 at 01:43 +0200, Matthias Schniedermeyer wrote:
> On 13.06.2013 00:30, Arno Wagner wrote:
> >
> > That said, unless you have high-resource attackers to defend
> > against, with something like, say, 8 complete-disk re-encryptions
> > you should be relatively secure. But don't blame me if it turns
> > out you are not.
>
> Or use one of the newer SSDs that take "the easy way" for secure
> erasing.
>
> At last one or more of the current generation controller chips encrypt
> the contents by default (even without enabling FDE), as the controller
> has to do some form of scrambling anyway as high-entrophy is better for
> the flash cells(*). So at least one does AES256 encryption always. When
> you secure erase such a SSD they typically just generate a new key and
> not actually erase the flash-cells.
Actually they still need to erase the cells, at least as part of the
garbage collection, since at one point they will be reused. And when you
do a secure erase, the few seconds needed to erase all the cells doesn't
really matter, I guess.
That said, nobody knows exactly what the firmware do.
> The unknown is if they "drop" the
> old key in a secure way, but if they do there is no way to decrypt older
> content even if you desolder the flash-chips.
>
> Also you have to have to hope that key generation is really random. That
> is something that can't really be proven (only disproven), so personally
> that is not something i could rely on.
And one needs to know how it is linked to the ATA password, too.
> So i classify it as a "nice to
> have", if it works it is a line of defense otherwise it is "nothing".
Yeah, right now I don't think I'd trust a self-encrypting SSD and would
put luks on top of it anyway. Note that you lose some performances here
since those SEDs work way better on compressible data.
>
> Problem is i can't remember which one(s) do(es) that, and it's bed time.
> :-)
SandForce (now LSI) controllers. Which can be found in OCZ and some
Intel drives.
Regards,
--
Yves-Alexis
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 490 bytes --]
prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-06-13 5:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-06-12 14:44 [dm-crypt] SSD disks and cryptsetup-reencrypt octane indice
2013-06-12 22:30 ` Arno Wagner
2013-06-12 23:43 ` Matthias Schniedermeyer
2013-06-13 5:51 ` Yves-Alexis Perez [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1371102701.4059.14.camel@scapa \
--to=corsac@debian.org \
--cc=dm-crypt@saout.de \
--cc=ms@citd.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.