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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
To: "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] random: Use arch_get_random_seed*() at init time and once a second
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 16:36:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1395099390-807-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1395099390-807-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com>

Use arch_get_random_seed*() in two places in the Linux random
driver (drivers/char/random.c):

1. During entropy pool initialization, use RDSEED in favor of RDRAND,
   with a fallback to the latter.  Entropy exhaustion is unlikely to
   happen there on physical hardware as the machine is single-threaded
   at that point, but could happen in a virtual machine.  In that
   case, the fallback to RDRAND will still provide more than adequate
   entropy pool initialization.

2. Once a second, issue RDSEED and, if successful, feed it to the
   entropy pool.  To ensure an extra layer of security, only credit
   half the entropy just in case.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d07575c..a4bea77 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -844,6 +844,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
 	cycles_t		cycles = random_get_entropy();
 	__u32			input[4], c_high, j_high;
 	__u64			ip;
+	unsigned long		seed;
+	int			credit;
 
 	c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0;
 	j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0;
@@ -862,20 +864,33 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
 
 	r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool;
 	__mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool), NULL);
+
 	/*
 	 * If we don't have a valid cycle counter, and we see
 	 * back-to-back timer interrupts, then skip giving credit for
-	 * any entropy.
+	 * any entropy, otherwise credit 1 bit.
 	 */
+	credit = 1;
 	if (cycles == 0) {
 		if (irq_flags & __IRQF_TIMER) {
 			if (fast_pool->last_timer_intr)
-				return;
+				credit = 0;
 			fast_pool->last_timer_intr = 1;
 		} else
 			fast_pool->last_timer_intr = 0;
 	}
-	credit_entropy_bits(r, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
+	 * add it to the pool.  For the sake of paranoia count it as
+	 * 50% entropic.
+	 */
+	if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
+		__mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed), NULL);
+		credit += sizeof(seed) * 4;
+	}
+
+	credit_entropy_bits(r, credit);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
@@ -1235,7 +1250,8 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 	r->last_pulled = jiffies;
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now), NULL);
 	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
 		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
 	}
-- 
1.8.5.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-03-17 23:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-03-17 23:36 [PATCH v2 0/4] RDSEED support for the Linux kernel H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-17 23:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86, random: Enable the RDSEED instruction H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-17 23:36 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2014-03-17 23:36 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] random: If we have arch_get_random_seed*(), try it before blocking H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-17 23:36 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] random: Add arch_has_random[_seed]() H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-18  3:44   ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2014-03-18 18:56     ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-18 21:52 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] RDSEED support for the Linux kernel tytso

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