From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Ian Campbell Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] xen/tools: Introduce QNX IFS loader Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 19:20:58 +0100 Message-ID: <1411496458.27559.26.camel@citrix.com> References: <1411409534-32733-1-git-send-email-oleksandr.tyshchenko@globallogic.com> <1411409534-32733-2-git-send-email-oleksandr.tyshchenko@globallogic.com> <1411487612.1781.81.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com> <21537.40352.544856.479035@mariner.uk.xensource.com> <1411490447.1781.111.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com> <21537.42802.301581.714879@mariner.uk.xensource.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <21537.42802.301581.714879@mariner.uk.xensource.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Ian Jackson Cc: Oleksandr Tyshchenko , xen-devel@lists.xen.org, julien.grall@linaro.org, tim@xen.org, stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Tue, 2014-09-23 at 18:00 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > Ian Campbell writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] xen/tools: Introduce QNX IFS loader"): > > On Tue, 2014-09-23 at 17:19 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > > > These would all have been security bugs if the v3 patch had been > > > accepted. They would have been bugs that would potentially amount to > > > privilege escalation for very many Xen installations. > > > > Well, those booting untrusted QNX guests on ARM, which won't be many > > yet, but point taken... > > No. The loader would run whenever it seems the appropriate image > type, so everyone with it compiled in is vulnerable. Yes, I realised this during dinner. Ian.