From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: deller@gmx.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, james.hogan@imgtec.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures" has been added to the 4.0-stable tree
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 12:53:47 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1433303627207133@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures
to the 4.0-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
parisc-metag-fix-crashes-due-to-stack-randomization-on-stack-grows-upwards-architectures.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.0 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From d045c77c1a69703143a36169c224429c48b9eecd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 22:01:27 +0200
Subject: parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures
From: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
commit d045c77c1a69703143a36169c224429c48b9eecd upstream.
On architectures where the stack grows upwards (CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP=y,
currently parisc and metag only) stack randomization sometimes leads to crashes
when the stack ulimit is set to lower values than STACK_RND_MASK (which is 8 MB
by default if not defined in arch-specific headers).
The problem is, that when the stack vm_area_struct is set up in fs/exec.c, the
additional space needed for the stack randomization (as defined by the value of
STACK_RND_MASK) was not taken into account yet and as such, when the stack
randomization code added a random offset to the stack start, the stack
effectively got smaller than what the user defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK)
which then sometimes leads to out-of-stack situations and crashes.
This patch fixes it by adding the maximum possible amount of memory (based on
STACK_RND_MASK) which theoretically could be added by the stack randomization
code to the initial stack size. That way, the user-defined stack size is always
guaranteed to be at minimum what is defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK).
This bug is currently not visible on the metag architecture, because on metag
STACK_RND_MASK is defined to 0 which effectively disables stack randomization.
The changes to fs/exec.c are inside an "#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP"
section, so it does not affect other platformws beside those where the
stack grows upwards (parisc and metag).
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h | 4 ++++
arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c | 3 +++
fs/exec.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -348,6 +348,10 @@ struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration..
#define ELF_HWCAP 0
+#define STACK_RND_MASK (is_32bit_task() ? \
+ 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
+ 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+
struct mm_struct;
extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *);
#define arch_randomize_brk arch_randomize_brk
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ static unsigned long mmap_upper_limit(vo
if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX)
stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX;
+ /* Add space for stack randomization. */
+ stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
return PAGE_ALIGN(STACK_TOP - stack_base);
}
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX)
stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX;
+ /* Add space for stack randomization. */
+ stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
/* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */
if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base)
return -ENOMEM;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from deller@gmx.de are
queue-4.0/parisc-metag-fix-crashes-due-to-stack-randomization-on-stack-grows-upwards-architectures.patch
reply other threads:[~2015-06-03 3:53 UTC|newest]
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