Re: Linux Firmware Signing

[Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>]

On Wed, 2015-09-02 at 20:46 +0200, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 01, 2015 at 11:35:05PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > OK great, I think that instead of passing the actual routine name we should
> > > instead pass an enum type for to the LSM, that'd be easier to parse and we'd
> > > then have each case well documented. Each LSM then could add its own
> > > documetnation for this and can switch on it. If we went with a name we'd have
> > > to to use something like __func__ and then parse that, its not clear if we need
> > > to get that specific.
> > 
> > Agreed.  IMA already defines an enumeration.
> > 
> > /* IMA policy related functions */
> > enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK,
> >                  FIRMWARE_CHECK, POLICY_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
> > 
> 
> We want something that is not only useful for IMA but any other LSM,
> and FILE_CHECK seems very broad, not sure what BPRM_CHECK is even upon
> inspecting kernel code. Likewise for POST_SETATTR. POLICY_CHECK might
> be broad, perhaps its best we define then a generic set of enums to
> which IMA can map them to then and let it decide. This would ensure
> that the kernel defines each use caes for file inspection carefully,
> documents and defines them and if an LSM wants to bunch a set together
> it can do so easily with a switch statement to map set of generic
> file checks in kernel to a group it already handles.

The names are based on the calling security hook.   For a description of
each of these security hooks refer to include/linux/lsm_hooks.h.
 
> For instance at least in the short term we'd try to unify:
> 
> security_kernel_fw_from_file()
> security_kernel_module_from_file()
> 
> to perhaps:
> 
> security_kernel_from_file()
> 
> As far, as far as I can tell, the only ones we'd be ready to start
> grouping immediately or with small amount of work rather soon:
> 
> /**
>  *
>  * enum security_filecheck - known kernel security file checks types
>  *
>  * @__SECURITY_FILECHECK_UNSPEC: attribute 0 reserved
>  * @SECURITY_FILECHECK_MODULE: the file being processed is a Linux kernel module
>  * @SECURITY_FILECHECK_SYSDATA: the file being processed is either a firmware
>  *	file or a system data file read from /lib/firmware/* by firmware_class
>  * @SECURITY_FILECHECK_KEXEC_KERNEL: the file being processed is a kernel file
>  * 	used by kexec
>  * @SECURITY_FILECHECK_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: the file being processed is an initramfs
>  * 	used by kexec
> 
>  * The kernel reads files directly from the filesystem for a series of
>  * operations.  The list of files the kernel reads from the filesystem are
>  * limited and each type of file consumed may have a different format and
>  * security vetting procedures. The kernel enables LSMs to vet for these files
>  * through a shared LSM hook prior to consumption. This list documents the
>  * different special kernel file types read by the kernel, it enables LSMs
>  * to vet for each differently if needed.
> enum security_filecheck {
> 	SECURITY_FILECHECK_UNSPEC,
> 	SECURITY_FILECHECK_MODULE,
> 	SECURITY_FILECHECK_SYSDATA,
> 	SECURITY_FILECHECK_KEXEC_KERNEL,
> 	SECURITY_FILECHECK_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
> };
> 
> Provided the MOK thing or alternative gets addressed we could also soon add
> something for SELinux policy files but that needs to be discussed further
> it seems. If MOK is used would SECURITY_FILECHECK_POLICY_MOK be OK? Again
> this would likely need further discussion, its why I didn't list it above.

Oh, I'm really confused as to why MOK would be a separate hook.  I
thought the discussion was about using a key in the UEFI MOK DB for
verifying locally signed files.

Mimi