Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions?

[Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.net>]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 894 bytes --]

On Sat, 2015-12-12 at 02:34 +0100, S.J. wrote:
> A bit more about the dd-is-bad-topic:
> 
> IMHO it doesn't matter at all.
Yes, fully agree.


> a) For this specific problem here, fixing a security problem
> automatically
> fixes the risk of data corruption because careless cloning+mounting
> (without UUID adjustments) too.
> So, if the user likes to use dd with its disadvantages, like waiting 
> hours to
> copy lots of free space, and bad practice, etc.etc., why should it
> concern
> the Btrfs developers and/or us here?
> 
> b) At wider scope; while Btrfs is more complex than Xfs etc.,
> currently
> there is no other reason why things could go bad when dd'ing
> something.
> As long as this holds, is there really a place in the official Btrfs 
> documentation
> for telling the users "dd is bad [practice]"?
> ...
fully agree as well. :-)


Cheers,
Chris.

[-- Attachment #2: smime.p7s --]
[-- Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature, Size: 5313 bytes --]