From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
pmoore@redhat.com, mgrepl@redhat.com
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: Strange AVC with latest rawhide kernel.
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 14:36:52 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1456429012.3702.56.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56CF523A.7000503@tycho.nsa.gov>
On Thu, 2016-02-25 at 14:12 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 02/25/2016 01:59 PM, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 2016-02-25 at 13:18 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > >
> > > On 02/25/2016 01:02 PM, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > audit2allow -wla
> > > > type=AVC msg=audit(1456422969.279:1434): avc: denied {
> > > > entrypoint
> > > > }
> > > > for pid=23847 comm="exe" path="/usr/bin/bash" dev="dm-2"
> > > > ino=25165968
> > > > scontext=system_u:system_r:svirt_lxc_net_t:s0:c337,c895
> > > > tcontext=system_u:object_r:svirt_sandbox_file_t:s0:c337,c895
> > > > tclass=file permissive=0
> > > > Was caused by:
> > > > Unknown - would be allowed by active policy
> > > > Possible mismatch between this policy and the
> > > > one under
> > > > which the audit message was generated.
> > > >
> > > > Possible mismatch between current in-memory
> > > > boolean
> > > > settings vs. permanent ones.
> > > >
> > > > When trying to run a docker container on Rawhide, I am seeing
> > > > this
> > > > AVC.
> > > > The policy as audit2allow -w shows allows svirt_sandbox_file_t
> > > > as
> > > > an
> > > > entrypoint for svirt_lxc_net_t.
> > > >
> > > > # sesearch -A -s svirt_lxc_net_t -t svirt_sandbox_file_t -c
> > > > file -p
> > > > entrypoint
> > > > Found 1 semantic av rules:
> > > > allow svirt_sandbox_domain file_type : file entrypoint ;
> > > >
> > > > But when I run try to start the container, docker blocks the
> > > > access. I
> > > > don't see any constraints that would block this, and don't
> > > > think
> > > > NO_NEW_PRIV is enabled any way, and I don't think it would be
> > > > involved
> > > > here.
> > > >
> > > > Any idea why SELinux is blocking the access?
> > > Also, what does compute_av report for that (scontext, tcontext,
> > > tclass)
> > > triple?
> > >
> > >
> > uname -r
> > 4.5.0-0.rc5.git0.1.fc24.x86_64
> >
> > ./compute_av system_u:system_r:svirt_lxc_net_t:s0:c337,c895
> > system_u:object_r:svirt_sandbox_file_t:s0:c337,c895 file
> > allowed= { ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock relabelfrom
> > relabelto append unlink link rename execute execute_no_trans
> > execmod
> > open }
> > auditdeny { ioctl read write create setattr lock relabelfrom
> > relabelto
> > append unlink link rename execute swapon quotaon mounton
> > execute_no_trans entrypoint execmod open audit_access 0xffc00000 }
> >
> > Looks like it is auditdeny, but I have no idea why.
> No, auditdeny is fine (default is to audit all denials, so all-bits-
> set,
> even for undefined permissions). The question is why isn't
> entrypoint
> listed in allowed - that shows that your kernel is indeed saying
> that
> entrypoint isn't allowed.
>
> Running the same kernel, with selinux-policy-3.13.1.171.fc24, when I
> run
> the same compute_av command as above, entrypoint is listed in
> allowed
> (in between execute_no_trans and execmod). Your policy is what?
>
>
rpm -q selinux-policy
selinux-policy-3.13.1-171.fc24.noarch
Ok I rm -rf /var/lib/selinux
dnf -y reinstall selinux-policy selinux-policy-targeted docker-selinux
And everything is working again.
I have no idea what was going on, but maybe their was something screwed
up somewhere and I was loading a different policy then I was examining.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-02-25 19:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-02-25 18:02 Strange AVC with latest rawhide kernel Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-25 18:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-02-25 18:18 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-02-25 18:59 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-25 19:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-02-25 19:36 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2016-02-25 19:37 ` Eric Paris
2016-02-25 19:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-02-25 20:28 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-25 20:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-02-26 12:54 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-26 15:46 ` Paul Moore
2016-02-26 15:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-02-26 16:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-26 19:50 ` James Carter
2016-02-26 20:30 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-29 16:27 ` James Carter
2016-02-29 17:27 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-26 17:13 ` Paul Moore
2016-02-26 19:41 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-26 16:31 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-26 17:15 ` Paul Moore
2016-02-26 19:42 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-25 20:36 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-29 10:10 ` Miroslav Grepl
2016-02-25 19:25 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-02-25 19:05 ` Paul Moore
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