All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: <jann@thejh.net>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	<andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>, <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	<ebiederm@xmission.com>, <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	<james.l.morris@oracle.com>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
	<luto@kernel.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <oleg@redhat.com>,
	<serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 23:09:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <14568737641489@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     security-let-security-modules-use-ptrace_mode_-with-bitmasks.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 15:00:01 -0800
Subject: security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks

From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>

commit 3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 upstream.

It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    8 +++-----
 security/yama/yama_lsm.c   |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -398,12 +398,10 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_
  */
 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
 {
-	switch (mode) {
-	case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
-		return MAY_READ;
-	case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
 		return MAY_READWRITE;
-	}
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+		return MAY_READ;
 
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(stru
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
-	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
 		switch (ptrace_scope) {
 		case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
 			/* No additional restrictions. */
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(stru
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (rc) {
+	if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
 		printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
 			"ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
 			child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jann@thejh.net are

queue-4.4/seccomp-always-propagate-no_new_privs-on-tsync.patch
queue-4.4/security-let-security-modules-use-ptrace_mode_-with-bitmasks.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2016-03-01 23:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=14568737641489@kroah.com \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=jann@thejh.net \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com \
    --cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=w@1wt.eu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.