From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2]
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2016 10:09:05 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1457449745.5321.141.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <449.1457448192@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Tue, 2016-03-08 at 14:43 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> The problem boils down to a difficulty in concocting a name that describes a
> complex situation that may change depending on the configuration. I can make
> it "restrict_link_by_any_system_trusted" if you'd prefer.
>
> That's why I want "system trusted keyrings" to refer to the builtin and the
> secondary - *and* an extra UEFI keyring if we grow one of those. It's a
> collection of related keyrings.
Sigh, this is the same discussion we've had for years. The UEFI keys
should not be trusted to validate the certificates being added to the
IMA keyring. Neither should the keys on the secondary keyring, unless
specifically IMA Kconfig enabled, be used to validate the certificates
being added to the IMA keyring. Just because the UEFI keys or the
secondary keyring is enabled, doesn't mean that certificates signed by a
key on either of those keyrings, should be added to the IMA keyring.
The machine/system owner should control which keys can be used to verify
certificates being added to the IMA keyring.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-08 15:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-04 15:00 [RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #2] David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to use " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-03-08 2:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 13:13 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 14:06 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 14:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:43 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 15:09 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-03-08 15:32 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 16:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok " David Howells
2016-03-08 2:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 13:08 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:14 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 14:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:44 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 15:48 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 16:07 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 16:37 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 22:05 ` Mimi Zohar
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