From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization
Date: Thu, 07 Apr 2016 18:17:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1460045867.2818.67.camel@debian.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLEENTFL_NYA5r4SqmUefkEwL68_Br6bX_RY2xNv95GVg@mail.gmail.com>
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On mer., 2016-04-06 at 14:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > This security feature reduces the predictability of
> > the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows.
>
> I would add "... rendering attacks much less stable." And if you can
> find a specific example exploit that is foiled by this, I would refer
> to it.
One good example might (or might not) be the keyring issue from earlier this
year (CVE-2016-0728):
http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-ker
nel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/
Regards,
--
Yves-Alexis
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-07 16:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-06 19:35 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier
2016-04-06 19:35 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-06 19:35 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-06 20:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-04-06 20:54 ` Greg KH
2016-04-06 21:03 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-06 21:03 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-06 21:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-04-06 21:45 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-06 21:45 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-07 15:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2016-04-07 15:28 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-07 15:28 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-07 16:17 ` Yves-Alexis Perez [this message]
2016-04-07 16:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2016-04-07 16:35 ` Thomas Garnier
2016-04-07 21:14 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2016-04-07 21:14 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2016-04-07 21:14 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2016-04-08 2:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-04-08 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-08 2:31 ` Kees Cook
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