From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ignat.korchagin@gmail.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, sasha.levin@oracle.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write" has been added to the 4.5-stable tree
Date: Mon, 02 May 2016 09:29:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <146220656755168@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
to the 4.5-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
usb-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.5 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000
Subject: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb upstream.
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device
if (!(size > 0))
return 0;
+ if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
+ /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
+ if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
+ usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+ return -EPIPE;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
if (ret != size) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ignat.korchagin@gmail.com are
queue-4.5/usb-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
reply other threads:[~2016-05-02 16:29 UTC|newest]
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