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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ebiggers@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tytso@mit.edu
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy" has been added to the 4.7-stable tree
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 17:18:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147369353118593@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy

to the 4.7-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     fscrypto-add-authorization-check-for-setting-encryption-policy.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.7 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 163ae1c6ad6299b19e22b4a35d5ab24a89791a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 10:57:08 -0700
Subject: fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit 163ae1c6ad6299b19e22b4a35d5ab24a89791a98 upstream.

On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user
could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they
had readonly access.  This is obviously problematic, since such a
directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy
would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory
(for example).

Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an
encryption policy.  This means that either the caller must own the file,
or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER.

(*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4
    v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/crypto/policy.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ static int create_encryption_context_fro
 int fscrypt_process_policy(struct inode *inode,
 				const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
 {
+	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	if (policy->version != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@google.com are

queue-4.7/fscrypto-add-authorization-check-for-setting-encryption-policy.patch
queue-4.7/fscrypto-only-allow-setting-encryption-policy-on-directories.patch

             reply	other threads:[~2016-09-12 15:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-12 15:18 gregkh [this message]
2016-09-12 18:49 ` Patch "fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy" has been added to the 4.7-stable tree Eric Biggers
2016-09-13  2:59   ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-09-15  6:18   ` Greg KH

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