From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jeff Layton Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 07/10] ceph: update cap message struct version to 9 Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2016 13:39:27 -0500 Message-ID: <1478543967.2386.43.camel@redhat.com> References: <1478259273-3471-1-git-send-email-jlayton@redhat.com> <1478259273-3471-8-git-send-email-jlayton@redhat.com> <1478264250.27698.1.camel@redhat.com> <1478517694.2386.13.camel@redhat.com> <1478528548.2386.26.camel@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: Received: from mail-qk0-f169.google.com ([209.85.220.169]:36200 "EHLO mail-qk0-f169.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932837AbcKGSkh (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Nov 2016 13:40:37 -0500 Received: by mail-qk0-f169.google.com with SMTP id n21so77020654qka.3 for ; Mon, 07 Nov 2016 10:39:31 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: Sage Weil Cc: "Yan, Zheng" , ceph-devel , Ilya Dryomov , Zheng Yan , Gregory Farnum On Mon, 2016-11-07 at 14:36 +0000, Sage Weil wrote: > On Mon, 7 Nov 2016, Jeff Layton wrote: > > On Mon, 2016-11-07 at 14:05 +0000, Sage Weil wrote: > > > On Mon, 7 Nov 2016, Jeff Layton wrote: > > > > On Mon, 2016-11-07 at 16:43 +0800, Yan, Zheng wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:57 PM, Jeff Layton wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, 2016-11-04 at 07:34 -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The userland ceph has MClientCaps at struct version 9. This brings the > > > > > > > kernel up the same version. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > With this change, we have to start tracking the btime and change_attr, > > > > > > > so that the client can pass back sane values in cap messages. The > > > > > > > client doesn't care about the btime at all, so this is just passed > > > > > > > around, but the change_attr is used when ceph is exported via NFS. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For now, the new "sync" parm is left at 0, to preserve the existing > > > > > > > behavior of the client. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > >  fs/ceph/caps.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > > > > > > >  1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c > > > > > > > index 6e99866b1946..452f5024589f 100644 > > > > > > > --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c > > > > > > > +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c > > > > > > > @@ -991,9 +991,9 @@ struct cap_msg_args { > > > > > > >       struct ceph_mds_session *session; > > > > > > >       u64                     ino, cid, follows; > > > > > > >       u64                     flush_tid, oldest_flush_tid, size, max_size; > > > > > > > -     u64                     xattr_version; > > > > > > > +     u64                     xattr_version, change_attr; > > > > > > >       struct ceph_buffer      *xattr_buf; > > > > > > > -     struct timespec         atime, mtime, ctime; > > > > > > > +     struct timespec         atime, mtime, ctime, btime; > > > > > > >       int                     op, caps, wanted, dirty; > > > > > > >       u32                     seq, issue_seq, mseq, time_warp_seq; > > > > > > >       kuid_t                  uid; > > > > > > > @@ -1026,13 +1026,13 @@ static int send_cap_msg(struct cap_msg_args *arg) > > > > > > > > > > > > > >       /* flock buffer size + inline version + inline data size + > > > > > > >        * osd_epoch_barrier + oldest_flush_tid */ > > > > > > > -     extra_len = 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8; > > > > > > > +     extra_len = 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 1; > > > > > > >       msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, sizeof(*fc) + extra_len, > > > > > > >                          GFP_NOFS, false); > > > > > > >       if (!msg) > > > > > > >               return -ENOMEM; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -     msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(6); > > > > > > > +     msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(9); > > > > > > >       msg->hdr.tid = cpu_to_le64(arg->flush_tid); > > > > > > > > > > > > > >       fc = msg->front.iov_base; > > > > > > > @@ -1068,17 +1068,30 @@ static int send_cap_msg(struct cap_msg_args *arg) > > > > > > >       } > > > > > > > > > > > > > >       p = fc + 1; > > > > > > > -     /* flock buffer size */ > > > > > > > +     /* flock buffer size (version 2) */ > > > > > > >       ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); > > > > > > > -     /* inline version */ > > > > > > > +     /* inline version (version 4) */ > > > > > > >       ceph_encode_64(&p, arg->inline_data ? 0 : CEPH_INLINE_NONE); > > > > > > >       /* inline data size */ > > > > > > >       ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); > > > > > > > -     /* osd_epoch_barrier */ > > > > > > > +     /* osd_epoch_barrier (version 5) */ > > > > > > >       ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); > > > > > > > -     /* oldest_flush_tid */ > > > > > > > +     /* oldest_flush_tid (version 6) */ > > > > > > >       ceph_encode_64(&p, arg->oldest_flush_tid); > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +     /* caller_uid/caller_gid (version 7) */ > > > > > > > +     ceph_encode_32(&p, (u32)-1); > > > > > > > +     ceph_encode_32(&p, (u32)-1); > > > > > > > > > > > > A bit of self-review... > > > > > > > > > > > > Not sure if we want to set the above to something else -- maybe 0 or to > > > > > > current's creds? That may not always make sense though (during e.g. > > > > > > writeback). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Looking further, I'm not quite sure I understand why we send creds at > > > > all in cap messages. Can you clarify where that matters? > > > > > > > > The way I look at it, would be to consider caps to be something like a > > > > more granular NFS delegation or SMB oplock. > > > > > > > > In that light, a cap flush is just the client sending updated attrs for > > > > the exclusive caps that it has already been granted. Is there a > > > > situation where we would ever want to refuse that update? > > > > > > A chmod or chown can be done locally if you have excl caps and flushed > > > back to the MDS via a caps message.  We need to verify the user has > > > permission to make the change. > > > > > > > My take is that once the MDS has delegated Ax to the client, then it's > > effectively trusting the client to handle permissions enforcement > > correctly. I don't see why we should second guess that. > > > > > > Note that nothing ever checks the return code for _do_cap_update in the > > > > userland code. If the permissions check fails, then we'll end up > > > > silently dropping the updated attrs on the floor. > > > > > > Yeah.  This was mainly for expediency... the protocol assumes that flushes > > > don't fail.  Given that the client does it's own permissions check, I > > > think the way to improve this is to have it prevent the flush in the first > > > place, so that it's only nefarious clients that are effected (and who > > > cares if they get confused).  I don't think we have a particularly good > > > way to tell the client it can't, say, sudo chmod 0:0 a file, though. > > > > > > > Sorry, I don't quite follow. How would we prevent the flush from a > > nefarious client (which is not something we can really control)? > > > > In any case...ISTM that the permissions check in _do_cap_update ought to > > be replaced by a cephx key check. IOW, what we really want to know is > > whether the client is truly the one to which we delegated the caps. If > > so, then we sort of have to trust that it's doing the right thing with > > respect to permissions checking here. > > The capability can say "you are allowed to be uid 1000 or uid 1020." We > want to delegate the EXCL caps to the client so that a create + chmod + > chown + write can all happen efficiently, but we still need to ensure that > the values they set are legal (a permitted uid/gid combo). > > A common example would be user workstations that are allowed access to > /home/user and restricted via their mds caps to their uid/gid.  We need to > prevent them from doing a 'sudo chown 0:0 foo'... > > On what basis do you make such a decision though? For instance, NFS does root-squashing which is (generally) a per-export+per-client thing. It sounds like you're saying that ceph has different semantics here? (cc'ing Greg here) Also, chown (at least under POSIX) is reserved for superuser only, and now that I look, I think this check in MDSAuthCaps::is_capable may be wrong: // chown/chgrp if (mask & MAY_CHOWN) { if (new_uid != caller_uid || // you can't chown to someone else inode_uid != caller_uid) { // you can't chown from someone else continue; } } Shouldn't this just be a check for whether the caller_uid is 0 (or whatever the correct check for the equivalent to the kernel's CAP_CHOWN would be)? -- Jeff Layton