From: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: Steve French <smfrench-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Valentin Hilbig
<externer.dl.hilbig-EnyPcy3oyxIb1SvskN2V4Q@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "linux-cifs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-cifs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: Linux CIFS client module: login rate limiting
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2017 16:27:26 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1485169046.17488.5.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAH2r5mtrOqucTBXE3Ni02gWGVBG+o-EbgdVarL1xZjWv0S2xyQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On Fri, 2017-01-20 at 15:30 -0600, Steve French wrote:
> A couple quick questions:
> 1) I would not expect "hard" vs "soft" mount option makes no
> difference here, but just doublechecking
> 2) How does smb2 reconnect behave in the same scenario (because we
> prefer smb3 to be used if the server is non-Samba)?
>
> Looks like a fix is doable - see line 1464-1465 of fs/cifs/sess.c
>
> while (sess_data->func)
> sess_data->func(sess_data);
>
> looking at cifs_reconnect in the case where the ip address is not
> available we wait 3 seconds (if needed to retry), and when that
> succeeds we schedule delayed work to issue an "echo" (see
> cifs_reconnect) and then as we do cifs_reconnect_tcon we could wait
> up
> to 10 seconds at a time for the socket to come back. If socket is ok
> we do a negotiate protocol which is not necessarily retried on
> failure
> (depending on the request it can return EAGAIN - e.g.
> read/write/lock/close). If the negprot succeeds we get to your case
> where we call cifs_setup_session in fs/cifs/connect.c which calls
> CIFS_SessSetup (in fs/cifs/sess.c) which looks like it will loop on
> the sessionsetup retry for the cifs case - which should as you note
> rate limit (especially on bad password case).
>
> I also would like Sachin's feedback as he made some significant
> cleanup of session establishment for cifs and rewrote this - wanted
> to
> see if he wanted to move the throttling of retries differently
I think the suggestion is perfectly valid and would be a nice addition
to the cifs module. Maybe a better place to add this change would be at
cifs_reconnect_tcon()
{
..
mutex_lock(&ses->session_mutex);
rc = cifs_negotiate_protocol(0, ses);
if (rc == 0 && ses->need_reconnect)
rc = cifs_setup_session(0, ses, nls_codepage);
..
}
Where in case of EACCES, we can setup a delayed work to unlock ses-
>session_mutex set to run after the required interval.
Sachin Prabhu
>
> On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 1:48 AM, Valentin Hilbig
> <externer.dl.hilbig-EnyPcy3oyxIb1SvskN2V4Q@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > Hello Linux Kernel CIFS-List,
> >
> > please forgive me to ninja-register to the list and start my
> > firstpost right
> > with the questions. This is done in the hope to save your time.
> > The long
> > background story is below in case you are interested:
> >
> > Q1) Is it possible on the CIFS client to implement caching for
> > failed
> > CIFS/SMB authentication replies? My wish is to cache those
> > negative replies
> > just a second (HZ), as 3600 retries per hour to re-establish a lost
> > connection to a CIFS server seems enough. Enough to succeed and
> > enough on
> > semi-permanent failures. I'd like to see this 1000ms cache as a
> > mount
> > default, as it's not for the initial request, just for the
> > subsequent
> > retries, but setting it to 0 (no cache) is ok for me, too, as it
> > then can be
> > changed at mount-time.
> >
> > Q2) As an extension I also would like to see something like a
> > maximum retry
> > counter, which declares a CIFS mount dead if we do not succeed
> > after N
> > negative replies. In my case N=40000 (around at least 11 hrs for
> > 1s cache
> > time) sounds good. However the rate-limiting is much more
> > important than
> > deactivating a rogue CIFS mount. Hence mount's default should be
> > N=0, which
> > means, infinite retries (as it is today).
> >
> > Q3) According to
> > https://www.kernel.org/doc/readme/Documentation-filesystems-cifs-RE
> > ADME
> > these features do not exist (yet). Are such features planned for
> > the kernel
> > CIFS client module? If not, is there a chance for me to get
> > patches
> > upstream in case that I provide them? Is there more to think of
> > than to
> > just follow the style guide (and provide kernel-grade code)? Of
> > course I
> > will extend the sysctl/proc interface to those new mount options in
> > a
> > compatible way (or discuss this with the list before I break
> > heritage).
> > However my patches will be for "our" kernels used here (3.13 and
> > 4.4), so
> > perhaps this needs some porting/upgrading for the latest (I am not
> > sure that
> > I get permission to take the time to provide patches to the current
> > kernel
> > as well).
> >
> > Sorry if some of those are FAQ, but as gmane.org is down/blank
> > currently, I
> > do not have access to the archive of kernel.cifs.
> >
> > If you some better ideas, please feel free to criticize me ;)
> >
> > Thanks,
> > -Tino
> > PS: FYI full long (sorry!) details follow in case you are
> > interested:
> >
> > (Sorry for missing logs and plain prose, I have no access to the
> > test
> > installation ATM, because it belongs to another group.)
> >
> > Here at LiMux (Linux for Munich) in certain situations (for example
> > the user
> > has changed the password in LDAP) we observe, that CIFS clients
> > might send
> > 30 or more failing CIFS-setup-requests per second(!) to the CIFS
> > server for
> > an existing (old) CIFS-mount. Each of this requests tries to
> > (re-)authenticate against AD/LDAP but fails, because the
> > credentials are no
> > more valid. After a short while the brute force protection of the
> > AD kicks
> > in and then blocks the AD-client (in this case the CIFS server)
> > from
> > accessing AD (for a while). Which means, other clients are
> > affected by the
> > faulty CIFS-mounts and prohibited to authenticate against the CIFS
> > server.
> >
> > The CIFS-Server-people cannot help, as the CIFS' vendor (no, not
> > Microsoft)
> > tells us to switch off brute-force-protection on AD-side, which is
> > something
> > we do not want to do for obvious reasons. The AD shall continue to
> > block
> > IPs with too many wrong requests. So the only option we have is,
> > to do
> > something against the high rate of AD-requests with a wrong
> > password coming
> > from CIFS clients.
> >
> > To observe the effect following must happen:
> >
> > - There is an old CIFS mount (for example a User's $HOME), which is
> > already
> > successfully mounted and working.
> >
> > - The TCP session to the CIFS server breaks (like inactivity or
> > some short
> > outage on the network. I used "tcpkill" to simulate that), such
> > that the
> > Kernel's CIFS module needs to re-establish a connection to the CIFS
> > server
> > for the next access, which then triggers re-authenticating with the
> > stored
> > credentials.
> >
> > - This re-authentication fails, due to a password change or locked
> > account
> > on the AD side. (If it succeeds there will be no problem, as then
> > the CIFS
> > mount is back to fully functional. The problem starts, when this
> > re-authentication does not work.)
> >
> > - And there also must be some culprit, in my case some user process
> > (we
> > haven't identified it yet but think it's something like
> > Thunderbird), which
> > tries to access the CIFS share in some looping fashion. (I used
> > "while
> > sleep 0.1; do touch /path/to/share/FILE; done" to test it.)
> >
> > Please note that there are too many possible user space
> > applications out
> > there which could rapidly hammer a defunct CIFS mount, such that
> > you won't
> > be able to fix them all. Hence we need a fix on some other level.
> >
> > (BTW we use version=1 of the protocol, and we require it, upgrading
> > 18k of
> > Linux workstations plus infrastructure against politics ain't
> > easy.)
> >
> > The CIFS module just forwards the request(s) to the CIFS server,
> > and, as the
> > TCP-connection is broken, tries to establish a new one. This
> > triggers
> > authentication, but the authentication fails. So the CIFS-client
> > sees a
> > negative reply like NT ACCOUNT LOCKED OUT, and answers something
> > like
> > "permission denied" to the userspace. So far, so correct,
> > everything works
> > perfectly as it should!
> >
> > The problem starts when some userspace application starts to loop
> > over the
> > fault, thereby accessing the CIFS share over and over again,
> > several times a
> > second. Then the CIFS module continues to do it's job, but it does
> > it much
> > too perfect. Each single userspace access will try to re-open the
> > session
> > to the CIFS server, again and again, which means we see a massive
> > amount of
> > authentication requests to the server which all are doomed. Even
> > worse, the
> > faster the server and the better the network, the more such failing
> > requests
> > you will see, of course. This triggers the AD brute force
> > protection even
> > faster.
> >
> > However, if those few CIFS-clients, which "freak out", would be
> > limited to
> > only send 1 request per second, then AD does not see too many
> > failed
> > requests per timespan, so everything stays operable.
> >
> > But even if this is implemented, this is only half of the story
> > (the
> > important half, but there is more to it):
> >
> > If we had rate-limiting in place the AD and CIFS server are out of
> > the loop.
> > But we still have the user account locked by the failing AD
> > requests. Let's
> > start over the case from the beginning under the assumption, that
> > we have
> > failed authentication reply caching with a 1s retry:
> >
> > - The user changes his password (perhaps using Windows, not Linux)
> > but does
> > not log out afterwards (on Linux).
> >
> > - The TCP-session of the CIFS mount breaks for some reason.
> >
> > - Some userspace process tries to access this CIFS mount in the
> > looping
> > fashion.
> >
> > - The Kernel's CIFS-module tries to re-establish the connection.
> >
> > - The requests fails due to old credential. (As above. Windows has
> > the new
> > password, but Linux not.)
> >
> > - After 5 such false retries (seen from the CIFS-Server) the AD
> > locks the
> > account. Now the Linux-Client sees NT ACCOUNT LOCKED (sp?). This
> > takes 5
> > seconds.
> >
> > - If the user comes back to work the next day and tries to login,
> > his
> > account is locked, of course.
> >
> > - He calls Help Desk to get his account unlocked. They do it.
> >
> > - But 5s later his account is locked, again. Thanks to 5 retries
> > seen from
> > the old login on the Linux client.
> >
> > - Wash, rinse, repeat.
> >
> > Eventually the user finds out where he is still logged in and logs
> > out, such
> > that (in our case) the (automated, yet no more working) user's
> > CIFS-mounts
> > vanish, too. This delays how long it takes until the user can work
> > normally, also it usually involves a lot of effort of other people
> > to solve
> > the riddle where the login hides.
> >
> > This is why I asked Q2 which would allow us to configure, that
> > after 11
> > hours (or so) the CIFS mount ceases to exist, such that the CIFS
> > client
> > stops trying to re-establish the connection. Which means, the next
> > business
> > day, the CIFS mount very likely has invalidated (it still is
> > mounted, but
> > quiet on the Linux side), such that the user can have his password
> > unlocked
> > without trouble.
> >
> > This is a tripple-win situation, as it not only helps the Users and
> > takes
> > the burden from Help Desk to diagnose a hard do diagnose situation,
> > it also
> > conserves some wasted network bandwidth and processing power due to
> > all
> > those fruitless authentication requests seen today. Sigh.
> >
> > I agree that all this is not the fault of the CIFS module. However
> > it is
> > better to start to be nice and polite to the infrastructure in case
> > something stupid happens, than to continue as usual and thereby
> > wasting
> > resources and possibly impact others, even when you are rightfully
> > doing
> > this.
> >
> > (This is a technical list, so I do not introduce myself, because I
> > am not
> > important. All you need to know is that I know Linux from 0.99 and
> > I am
> > able to hack the kernel, but until now only for my very own
> > needs. BTW, my
> > private GitHub is https://github.com/hilbix/)
> >
> > Thanks for any help or comments,
> >
> > -Tino
> >
> > --
> > Mit freundlichen Grüßen
> > Valentin Hilbig
> > Externer Dienstleister
> >
> > IT@M - Dienstleister für Informations- und
> > Telekommunikationstechnik der
> > Landeshauptstadt München
> > Geschäftsbereich Werkzeuge und Infrastruktur
> > Servicebereich Städtische Arbeitsplätze
> > Serviceteam LiMux-Arbeitsplatz I23
> > LiMux-Basisclient
> >
> > Raum A2.030, Agnes-Pockels-Bogen 21, 80992 München
> >
> > Tel.: +49 89 233-782273
> > E-Mail: externer.dl.hilbig-EnyPcy3oyxIb1SvskN2V4Q@public.gmane.org
> > --
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-
> > cifs" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
> > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-23 10:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-19 7:48 Linux CIFS client module: login rate limiting Valentin Hilbig
[not found] ` <58806F39.9010801-EnyPcy3oyxIb1SvskN2V4Q@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-20 21:30 ` Steve French
[not found] ` <CAH2r5mtrOqucTBXE3Ni02gWGVBG+o-EbgdVarL1xZjWv0S2xyQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-23 10:57 ` Sachin Prabhu [this message]
[not found] ` <1485169046.17488.5.camel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-24 9:57 ` Sachin Prabhu
[not found] ` <1485251879.17488.14.camel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-28 16:34 ` Valentin Hilbig
2017-01-23 12:13 ` Valentin Hilbig
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