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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ebiggers3@gmail.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tytso@mit.edu
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "random: properly align get_random_int_hash" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 11:19:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149725916818480@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    random: properly align get_random_int_hash

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     random-properly-align-get_random_int_hash.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From b1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 21:08:39 -0400
Subject: random: properly align get_random_int_hash

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>

commit b1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 upstream.

get_random_long() reads from the get_random_int_hash array using an
unsigned long pointer.  For this code to be guaranteed correct on all
architectures, the array must be aligned to an unsigned long boundary.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1798,13 +1798,15 @@ int random_int_secret_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash)
+		__aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
+
 /*
  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
  * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random
  * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
  * depleting entropy is too high
  */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
 unsigned int get_random_int(void)
 {
 	__u32 *hash;


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers3@gmail.com are

queue-4.4/random-properly-align-get_random_int_hash.patch
queue-4.4/crypto-gcm-wait-for-crypto-op-not-signal-safe.patch

             reply	other threads:[~2017-06-12  9:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-12  9:19 gregkh [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-08-18  9:37 Patch "random: properly align get_random_int_hash" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh

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