From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: mort@bork.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, horia.geanta@nxp.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "crypto: talitos - Extend max key length for SHA384/512-HMAC and AEAD" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 11:44:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1500457473241169@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
crypto: talitos - Extend max key length for SHA384/512-HMAC and AEAD
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
crypto-talitos-extend-max-key-length-for-sha384-512-hmac-and-aead.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 03d2c5114c95797c0aa7d9f463348b171a274fd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin Hicks <mort@bork.org>
Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 09:38:35 -0400
Subject: crypto: talitos - Extend max key length for SHA384/512-HMAC and AEAD
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From: Martin Hicks <mort@bork.org>
commit 03d2c5114c95797c0aa7d9f463348b171a274fd4 upstream.
An updated patch that also handles the additional key length requirements
for the AEAD algorithms.
The max keysize is not 96. For SHA384/512 it's 128, and for the AEAD
algorithms it's longer still. Extend the max keysize for the
AEAD size for AES256 + HMAC(SHA512).
Fixes: 357fb60502ede ("crypto: talitos - add sha224, sha384 and sha512 to existing AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Martin Hicks <mort@bork.org>
Acked-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ static void talitos_unregister_rng(struc
* crypto alg
*/
#define TALITOS_CRA_PRIORITY 3000
-#define TALITOS_MAX_KEY_SIZE 96
+#define TALITOS_MAX_KEY_SIZE (AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE + SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE)
#define TALITOS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 /* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE */
struct talitos_ctx {
@@ -1388,6 +1388,11 @@ static int ablkcipher_setkey(struct cryp
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
+ if (keylen > TALITOS_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+ crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
memcpy(&ctx->key, key, keylen);
ctx->keylen = keylen;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mort@bork.org are
queue-4.4/crypto-talitos-extend-max-key-length-for-sha384-512-hmac-and-aead.patch
/* Find the device for this VNI */
hash = geneve_net_vni_hash(vni);
vni_list_head = &gs->vni_list[hash];
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(geneve, vni_list_head, hlist) {
- if (eq_tun_id_and_vni((u8 *)&geneve->info.key.tun_id, vni) &&
- ipv6_addr_equal(&addr6, &geneve->info.key.u.ipv6.dst))
- return geneve;
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, vni_list_head, hlist) {
+ if (eq_tun_id_and_vni((u8 *)&node->geneve->info.key.tun_id, vni) &&
+ ipv6_addr_equal(&addr6, &node->geneve->info.key.u.ipv6.dst))
+ return node->geneve;
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -579,6 +587,7 @@ static int geneve_sock_add(struct geneve
{
struct net *net = geneve->net;
struct geneve_net *gn = net_generic(net, geneve_net_id);
+ struct geneve_dev_node *node;
struct geneve_sock *gs;
__u8 vni[3];
__u32 hash;
@@ -597,15 +606,20 @@ static int geneve_sock_add(struct geneve
out:
gs->collect_md = geneve->collect_md;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- if (ipv6)
+ if (ipv6) {
rcu_assign_pointer(geneve->sock6, gs);
- else
+ node = &geneve->hlist6;
+ } else
#endif
+ {
rcu_assign_pointer(geneve->sock4, gs);
+ node = &geneve->hlist4;
+ }
+ node->geneve = geneve;
tunnel_id_to_vni(geneve->info.key.tun_id, vni);
hash = geneve_net_vni_hash(vni);
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&geneve->hlist, &gs->vni_list[hash]);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->hlist, &gs->vni_list[hash]);
return 0;
}
@@ -632,8 +646,10 @@ static int geneve_stop(struct net_device
{
struct geneve_dev *geneve = netdev_priv(dev);
- if (!hlist_unhashed(&geneve->hlist))
- hlist_del_rcu(&geneve->hlist);
+ hlist_del_init_rcu(&geneve->hlist4.hlist);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ hlist_del_init_rcu(&geneve->hlist6.hlist);
+#endif
geneve_sock_release(geneve);
return 0;
}
reply other threads:[~2017-07-19 10:03 UTC|newest]
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