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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com, jgross@suse.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: WTF: patch "[PATCH] x86/xen: allow userspace access during hypercalls" was seriously submitted to be applied to the 4.12-stable tree?
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 16:45:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1500939902223208@kroah.com> (raw)

The patch below was submitted to be applied to the 4.12-stable tree.

I fail to see how this patch meets the stable kernel rules as found at
Documentation/process/stable_kernel_rules.rst.

I could be totally wrong, and if so, please respond to 
<stable@vger.kernel.org> and let me know why this patch should be
applied.  Otherwise, it is now dropped from my patch queues, never to be
seen again.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

>From c54590cac51db8ab5fd30156bdaba34af915e629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Marek=20Marczykowski-G=C3=B3recki?=
 <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2017 14:49:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/xen: allow userspace access during hypercalls
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Userspace application can do a hypercall through /dev/xen/privcmd, and
some for some hypercalls argument is a pointers to user-provided
structure. When SMAP is supported and enabled, hypervisor can't access.
So, lets allow it.

The same applies to HYPERVISOR_dm_op, where additionally privcmd driver
carefully verify buffer addresses.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
index 7a4db5fefd15..11071fcd630e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/smap.h>
 
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
 #include <xen/interface/sched.h>
@@ -216,10 +217,12 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call,
 	__HYPERCALL_DECLS;
 	__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
 
+	stac();
 	asm volatile("call *%[call]"
 		     : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
 		     : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
 		     : __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5);
+	clac();
 
 	return (long)__res;
 }
@@ -478,7 +481,11 @@ static inline int
 HYPERVISOR_dm_op(
 	domid_t dom, unsigned int nr_bufs, struct xen_dm_op_buf *bufs)
 {
-	return _hypercall3(int, dm_op, dom, nr_bufs, bufs);
+	int ret;
+	stac();
+	ret = _hypercall3(int, dm_op, dom, nr_bufs, bufs);
+	clac();
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static inline void

             reply	other threads:[~2017-07-24 23:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 23:45 gregkh [this message]
2017-07-25  0:09 ` WTF: patch "[PATCH] x86/xen: allow userspace access during hypercalls" was seriously submitted to be applied to the 4.12-stable tree? Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2017-07-25  0:13   ` Greg KH

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