From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: lucien.xin@gmail.com, davem@davemloft.net, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "sctp: fix an array overflow when all ext chunks are set" has been added to the 4.12-stable tree
Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2017 16:29:23 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <150223496389127@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
sctp: fix an array overflow when all ext chunks are set
to the 4.12-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
sctp-fix-an-array-overflow-when-all-ext-chunks-are-set.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.12 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Tue Aug 8 16:27:29 PDT 2017
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 22:07:33 +0800
Subject: sctp: fix an array overflow when all ext chunks are set
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 10b3bf54406bb7f4e78da9bb2a485c5c986678ad ]
Marcelo noticed an array overflow caused by commit c28445c3cb07
("sctp: add reconf_enable in asoc ep and netns"), in which sctp
would add SCTP_CID_RECONF into extensions when reconf_enable is
set in sctp_make_init and sctp_make_init_ack.
Then now when all ext chunks are set, 4 ext chunk ids can be put
into extensions array while extensions array size is 3. It would
cause a kernel panic because of this overflow.
This patch is to fix it by defining extensions array size is 4 in
both sctp_make_init and sctp_make_init_ack.
Fixes: c28445c3cb07 ("sctp: add reconf_enable in asoc ep and netns")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const
sctp_adaptation_ind_param_t aiparam;
sctp_supported_ext_param_t ext_param;
int num_ext = 0;
- __u8 extensions[3];
+ __u8 extensions[4];
sctp_paramhdr_t *auth_chunks = NULL,
*auth_hmacs = NULL;
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init_ack(co
sctp_adaptation_ind_param_t aiparam;
sctp_supported_ext_param_t ext_param;
int num_ext = 0;
- __u8 extensions[3];
+ __u8 extensions[4];
sctp_paramhdr_t *auth_chunks = NULL,
*auth_hmacs = NULL,
*auth_random = NULL;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lucien.xin@gmail.com are
queue-4.12/sctp-fix-the-check-for-_sctp_walk_params-and-_sctp_walk_errors.patch
queue-4.12/dccp-fix-a-memleak-that-dccp_ipv6-doesn-t-put-reqsk-properly.patch
queue-4.12/dccp-fix-a-memleak-that-dccp_ipv4-doesn-t-put-reqsk-properly.patch
queue-4.12/dccp-fix-a-memleak-for-dccp_feat_init-err-process.patch
queue-4.12/sctp-fix-an-array-overflow-when-all-ext-chunks-are-set.patch
reply other threads:[~2017-08-08 23:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=150223496389127@kroah.com \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=lucien.xin@gmail.com \
--cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.