All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
To: "JBeulich@suse.com" <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: avoid #GP for PV guest MSR accesses
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 10:32:11 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1506076331.3246.2.camel@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <59C4EEA3020000780017E6DE@prv-mh.provo.novell.com>

On Fri, 2017-09-22 at 03:06 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Halfway recent Linux kernels probe MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES on all CPUs,
> leading to ugly recovered #GP fault messages with debug builds on older
> systems. We can do better, so introduce synthetic feature flags for
> both this and PLATFORM_INFO to avoid the rdmsr_safe() altogether.
> 
> The rdmsr_safe() uses for MISC_ENABLE are left in place as benign - it
> exists for all 64-bit capable Intel CPUs (see e.g. early_init_intel()).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

The intent of this patch (and the related "VMX: PLATFORM_INFO MSR is
r/o") is somewhat intersects with my series "Generic MSR policy:
infrastructure + cpuid_faulting". IMHO it's better to fix MSR-related
issues in the scope of the MSR policy work.

Also, I have one question below.

> 
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
> @@ -21,10 +21,19 @@ static bool __init probe_intel_cpuid_fau
>  {
>  	uint64_t x;
>  
> -	if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO, x) ||
> -	    !(x & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULTING))
> +	if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO, x))
>  		return 0;
>  
> +	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO);
> +
> +	if (!(x & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULTING)) {
> +		if (!rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, x))
> +			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_MISC_FEATURES);
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_MISC_FEATURES);
> +
>  	expected_levelling_cap |= LCAP_faulting;
>  	levelling_caps |=  LCAP_faulting;
>  	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING);
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
> @@ -941,8 +941,7 @@ static int read_msr(unsigned int reg, ui
>          return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>  
>      case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
> -        if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
> -             rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO, *val) )
> +        if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO) )
>              break;
>          *val = 0;
>          if ( this_cpu(cpuid_faulting_enabled) )
> @@ -950,8 +949,7 @@ static int read_msr(unsigned int reg, ui
>          return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>  
>      case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
> -        if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
> -             rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, *val) )
> +        if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_MISC_FEATURES) )
>              break;
>          *val = 0;
>          if ( curr->arch.cpuid_faulting )
> @@ -1147,15 +1145,13 @@ static int write_msr(unsigned int reg, u
>          return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>  
>      case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
> -        if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
> -             val || rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO, val) )
> +        if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO) || val )
>              break;
>          return X86EMUL_OKAY;

Why writes to MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO shouldn't produce #GP faults for
PV guests?

>  
>      case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
> -        if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
> -             (val & ~MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING) ||
> -             rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, temp) )
> +        if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_MISC_FEATURES) ||
> +             (val & ~MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING) )
>              break;
>          if ( (val & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING) &&
>               !this_cpu(cpuid_faulting_enabled) )
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -22,3 +22,5 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(APERFMPERF,      (FSCAPIN
>  XEN_CPUFEATURE(MFENCE_RDTSC,    (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 9) /* MFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
>  XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMEP,        (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+10) /* SMEP gets used by Xen itself */
>  XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMAP,        (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+11) /* SMAP gets used by Xen itself */
> +XEN_CPUFEATURE(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+12) /* PLATFORM_INFO MSR present */
> +XEN_CPUFEATURE(MSR_MISC_FEATURES, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+13) /* MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES MSR present */
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
-- 
Thanks,
Sergey
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

  reply	other threads:[~2017-09-22 10:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-22  9:06 [PATCH] x86: avoid #GP for PV guest MSR accesses Jan Beulich
2017-09-22 10:32 ` Sergey Dyasli [this message]
2017-09-22 10:44   ` Jan Beulich

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1506076331.3246.2.camel@citrix.com \
    --to=sergey.dyasli@citrix.com \
    --cc=Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.