From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:50476 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751649AbdJBJ53 (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 Oct 2017 05:57:29 -0400 Subject: Patch "security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree To: Jason@zx2c4.com, dhowells@redhat.com, ebiggers3@gmail.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, k.marinushkin@gmail.com Cc: , From: Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2017 11:57:30 +0200 Message-ID: <150693825047169@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: security-keys-properly-zero-out-sensitive-key-material-in-big_key.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let know about it. >>From 910801809b2e40a4baedd080ef5d80b4a180e70e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 16:58:38 +0200 Subject: security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key From: Jason A. Donenfeld commit 910801809b2e40a4baedd080ef5d80b4a180e70e upstream. Error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so this patch changes some kfrees into a kzfrees. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Kirill Marinushkin Cc: security@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/keys/big_key.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparse *path = file->f_path; path_get(path); fput(file); - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); } else { /* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparse err_fput: fput(file); err_enckey: - kfree(enckey); + kzfree(enckey); error: - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); return ret; } @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_pr path_put(path); } - kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); + kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); } /* @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) path->mnt = NULL; path->dentry = NULL; } - kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); + kzfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL; } @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, err_fput: fput(file); error: - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); } else { ret = datalen; if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from Jason@zx2c4.com are queue-4.9/security-keys-rewrite-all-of-big_key-crypto.patch queue-4.9/security-keys-properly-zero-out-sensitive-key-material-in-big_key.patch