All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@embeddedor.com>,
	"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@monkey.org>,
	Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>,
	Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-nfs list <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: sunrpc: svcauth_gss: use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2017 13:04:50 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1508951090.4655.7.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171024151242.Horde.9xuLnnVxPJHwTDEYl2gMQ60@gator4166.hostgator.com>

On Tue, 2017-10-24 at 15:12 -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> Quoting "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>:
> 
> > On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 02:18:52PM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2017-10-24 at 13:53 -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 01:26:49PM -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote:
> > > > > Is there a reason to BUG() in these places? Couldn't we  
> > > 
> > > WARN_ON_ONCE and return an error?
> > > > 
> > > > I think the BUG() will just kill an nfsd thread that isn't holding any
> > > > interesting locks.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Not necessarily. If panic_on_oops is set (and it usually is in
> > > "production" setups), it'll crash the box there.
> > 
> > Maybe they're getting what they asked for?
> > 
> > > > The failures look unlikely.  (Except for that read_u32... return, I
> > > > wonder if we're missing a check there.)
> > > 
> > > Agreed, looks like you only hit an error if the read attempts to go out
> > > of bounds. In principle that shouldn't ever happen (and I haven't seen
> > > any reports of it).
> > > 
> > > Still...I agree with Dros that it's better to handle this without
> > > oopsing if we can. We can return an error from either of those
> > > functions. A sane error and a WARN_ONCE would be better here.
> > 
> > OK, OK, OK.
> > 
> > There are also some more BUGs that could use looking into if anyone
> > wants to.
> > 
> > --b.
> > 
> > commit eb754930662f
> > Author: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> > Date:   Tue Oct 24 14:58:11 2017 -0400
> > 
> >     rpc: remove some BUG()s
> > 
> >     It would be kinder to WARN() and recover in several spots here instead
> >     of BUG()ing.
> > 
> >     Also, it looks like the read_u32_from_xdr_buf() call could actually
> >     fail, though it might require a broken (or malicious) client, so convert
> >     that to just an error return.
> > 
> >     Reported-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@monkey.org>
> >     Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> > 
> > diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c  
> > b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
> > index 7b1ee5a0b03c..73165e9ca5bf 100644
> > --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
> > +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
> > @@ -855,11 +855,13 @@ unwrap_integ_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,  
> > struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct g
> >  		return stat;
> >  	if (integ_len > buf->len)
> >  		return stat;
> > -	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len))
> > -		BUG();
> > +	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len)) {
> > +		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> > +		return stat;
> > +	}
> >  	/* copy out mic... */
> >  	if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len))
> > -		BUG();
> > +		return stat;
> >  	if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
> >  		return stat;
> >  	mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > @@ -1611,8 +1613,10 @@ svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> >  	BUG_ON(integ_len % 4);
> >  	*p++ = htonl(integ_len);
> >  	*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
> > -	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset, integ_len))
> > -		BUG();
> > +	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset, integ_len)) {
> > +		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> > +		goto out_err;
> > +	}
> >  	if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
> >  		if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
> >  			goto out_err;
> 
> What about the following BUG() at net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c:1058:
> 
> /*
>   * Remove a dead transport
>   */
> static void svc_delete_xprt(struct svc_xprt *xprt)
> {
>          struct svc_serv *serv = xprt->xpt_server;
>          struct svc_deferred_req *dr;
> 
>          /* Only do this once */
>          if (test_and_set_bit(XPT_DEAD, &xprt->xpt_flags))
>                  BUG();
> 
>          dprintk("svc: svc_delete_xprt(%p)\n", xprt);
>          xprt->xpt_ops->xpo_detach(xprt);
> 
>          spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);
>          list_del_init(&xprt->xpt_list);
>          WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&xprt->xpt_ready));
>          if (test_bit(XPT_TEMP, &xprt->xpt_flags))
>                  serv->sv_tmpcnt--;
>          spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);
> 
>          while ((dr = svc_deferred_dequeue(xprt)) != NULL)
>                  kfree(dr);
> 
>          call_xpt_users(xprt);
>          svc_xprt_put(xprt);
> }
> 
> I'm suspicious about that comment above the _if_ condition: /* Only do  
> this once */
> 
> Would it help to replace that BUG with a WARN_ON_ONCE?
> 

Maybe. How safe is it to run all of that more than once after XPT_DEAD
is set? You'd probably just end up crashing at some later point down the
line anyway...

I suppose you could do a WARN() there and then return without actually
doing anything. That might let you limp along if you did hit this.
-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

      reply	other threads:[~2017-10-25 17:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-23 18:16 [PATCH] net: sunrpc: svcauth_gss: use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG Gustavo A. R. Silva
2017-10-23 20:31 ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-10-23 20:31   ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-10-24 17:26   ` Weston Andros Adamson
2017-10-24 17:26     ` Weston Andros Adamson
2017-10-24 17:53     ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-10-24 17:53       ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-10-24 18:18       ` Jeff Layton
2017-10-24 19:07         ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-10-24 20:12           ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2017-10-24 20:12             ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2017-10-25 17:04             ` Jeff Layton [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1508951090.4655.7.camel@redhat.com \
    --to=jlayton@redhat.com \
    --cc=anna.schumaker@netapp.com \
    --cc=bfields@fieldses.org \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dros@monkey.org \
    --cc=garsilva@embeddedor.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=trond.myklebust@primarydata.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.