diff for duplicates of <1509132746.3729.9.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N1/1.txt index 5a546d4..b502605 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N1/1.txt @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 10:17 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 11:54:43AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Thu, 2017-10-19 at 15:51 +0100, David Howells wrote: -> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> +> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image > > > > through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set. @@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 10:17 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > leaves out testing to see if the integrity subsystem is enabled. > > > > > > Commit 503ceaef8e2e "ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring -> > > file signatures" was upstreamed. An additional patch could force +> > > file signatures" was upstreamed. ?An additional patch could force > > > these rules to be added to the custom policy, if lockdown is enabled. -> > > This and other patches in this series could then check to see if +> > > ?This and other patches in this series could then check to see if > > > is_ima_appraise_enabled() is true. > > > > > > Mimi @@ -29,14 +29,14 @@ On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 10:17 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > I have updated the patch title and description, and I also added > > is_ima_appraise_enabled() as the following. Is it good to you? > -> Yes, that works. Thanks! Remember is_ima_appraise_enabled() is +> Yes, that works. ?Thanks! ?Remember is_ima_appraise_enabled() is > dependent on the "ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode" -> patch - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/201 +> patch -?http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/201 > 7-October/003910.html. > > The IMA "secure_boot" policy can be specified on the boot command line -> as ima_policy="secure_boot". It requires kernel modules, firmware, -> kexec kernel image and the IMA custom policy to be signed. In +> as ima_policy="secure_boot". ?It requires kernel modules, firmware, +> kexec kernel image and the IMA custom policy to be signed. ?In > lockdown mode, these rules are enabled by default and added to the > custom policy. > @@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 10:17 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > ima_post_read_file() respectively. Hm, with "lockdown" enabled on the boot command line, I'm now able to -do the kexec load, but not the unload. :/ After the kexec load with +do the kexec load, but not the unload. :/ ? After the kexec load with the "--reuse-cmdline" option, the system reboots, but isn't in "lockdown" mode. + +-- +To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in +the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org +More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest index db2df3b..77a3329 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N1/content_digest @@ -3,19 +3,10 @@ "ref\01508774083.3639.124.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com\0" "ref\020171026074243.GM8550@linux-l9pv.suse\0" "ref\01509027463.5886.26.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com\0" - "ref\01509027463.5886.26.camel-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org\0" - "From\0Mimi Zohar <zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>\0" - "Subject\0Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set\0" + "From\0zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)\0" + "Subject\0[PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set\0" "Date\0Fri, 27 Oct 2017 15:32:26 -0400\0" - "To\0joeyli <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>\0" - "Cc\0David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>" - linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org - gnomes-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org - linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org - gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org - linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org - jforbes-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org - " Matthew Garrett <mjg59-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>\0" + "To\0linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org\0" "\00:1\0" "b\0" "On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 10:17 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:\n" @@ -26,7 +17,7 @@ "> > \n" "> > On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 11:54:43AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:\n" "> > > On Thu, 2017-10-19 at 15:51 +0100, David Howells wrote:\n" - "> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>\n" + "> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>\n" "> > > > \n" "> > > > When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image\n" "> > > > through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set.\n" @@ -38,9 +29,9 @@ "> > > leaves out testing to see if the integrity subsystem is enabled.\n" "> > > \n" "> > > Commit 503ceaef8e2e \"ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring\n" - "> > > file signatures\" was upstreamed. \302\240An additional patch could force\n" + "> > > file signatures\" was upstreamed. ?An additional patch could force\n" "> > > these rules to be added to the custom policy, if lockdown is enabled.\n" - "> > > \302\240This and other patches in this series could then check to see if\n" + "> > > ?This and other patches in this series could then check to see if\n" "> > > is_ima_appraise_enabled() is true.\n" "> > > \n" "> > > Mimi\n" @@ -49,14 +40,14 @@ "> > I have updated the patch title and description, and I also added\n" "> > is_ima_appraise_enabled() as the following. Is it good to you?\n" "> \n" - "> Yes, that works. \302\240Thanks! \302\240Remember is_ima_appraise_enabled() is\n" + "> Yes, that works. ?Thanks! ?Remember is_ima_appraise_enabled() is\n" "> dependent on the \"ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode\"\n" - "> patch -\302\240http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/201\n" + "> patch -?http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/201\n" "> 7-October/003910.html.\n" "> \n" "> The IMA \"secure_boot\" policy can be specified on the boot command line\n" - "> as ima_policy=\"secure_boot\". \302\240It requires kernel modules, firmware,\n" - "> kexec kernel image and the IMA custom policy to be signed. \302\240In\n" + "> as ima_policy=\"secure_boot\". ?It requires kernel modules, firmware,\n" + "> kexec kernel image and the IMA custom policy to be signed. ?In\n" "> lockdown mode, these rules are enabled by default and added to the\n" "> custom policy.\n" "> \n" @@ -70,8 +61,13 @@ "> ima_post_read_file() respectively.\n" "\n" "Hm, with \"lockdown\" enabled on the boot command line, I'm now able to\n" - "do the kexec load, but not the unload. :/ \302\240 After the kexec load with\n" + "do the kexec load, but not the unload. :/ ? After the kexec load with\n" "the \"--reuse-cmdline\" option, the system reboots, but isn't in\n" - "\"lockdown\" mode." + "\"lockdown\" mode.\n" + "\n" + "--\n" + "To unsubscribe from this list: send the line \"unsubscribe linux-security-module\" in\n" + "the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org\n" + More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html -d1b1a58cd8a2cc2bb9b21ac2a22e43e021bd0eafab79fce898b0dd31394eff26 +3b2f91c9511b695cf9221822e0b96ddc63403be82e6a25fe8805fce5d03d65f2
diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N2/1.txt index 5a546d4..9d182a2 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N2/1.txt @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 10:17 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 11:54:43AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Thu, 2017-10-19 at 15:51 +0100, David Howells wrote: -> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> +> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image > > > > through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set. diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N2/content_digest index db2df3b..c6fd18e 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N2/content_digest @@ -3,19 +3,18 @@ "ref\01508774083.3639.124.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com\0" "ref\020171026074243.GM8550@linux-l9pv.suse\0" "ref\01509027463.5886.26.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com\0" - "ref\01509027463.5886.26.camel-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org\0" - "From\0Mimi Zohar <zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>\0" + "From\0Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>\0" "Subject\0Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set\0" "Date\0Fri, 27 Oct 2017 15:32:26 -0400\0" - "To\0joeyli <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>\0" - "Cc\0David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>" - linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org - gnomes-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org - linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org - gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org - linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org - jforbes-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org - " Matthew Garrett <mjg59-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>\0" + "To\0joeyli <jlee@suse.com>\0" + "Cc\0David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>" + linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org + gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk + linux-efi@vger.kernel.org + gregkh@linuxfoundation.org + linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org + jforbes@redhat.com + " Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>\0" "\00:1\0" "b\0" "On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 10:17 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:\n" @@ -26,7 +25,7 @@ "> > \n" "> > On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 11:54:43AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:\n" "> > > On Thu, 2017-10-19 at 15:51 +0100, David Howells wrote:\n" - "> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>\n" + "> > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>\n" "> > > > \n" "> > > > When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image\n" "> > > > through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set.\n" @@ -74,4 +73,4 @@ "the \"--reuse-cmdline\" option, the system reboots, but isn't in\n" "\"lockdown\" mode." -d1b1a58cd8a2cc2bb9b21ac2a22e43e021bd0eafab79fce898b0dd31394eff26 +dba2ac175c89561a8c993e4615103873c5ed36e2967d465920169451d3ec9661
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