From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] evm: allow metadata changes for inode without xattr support
Date: Fri, 03 Nov 2017 14:26:18 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1509733578.3416.93.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171103211135.093559bc@totoro>
On Fri, 2017-11-03 at 21:11 +0300, Mikhail Kurinnoi wrote:
> ? Fri, 03 Nov 2017 13:15:31 -0400
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> ?????:
>
> > On Fri, 2017-11-03 at 20:06 +0300, Mikhail Kurinnoi wrote:
> > > ? Fri, 03 Nov 2017 12:54:08 -0400
> > > Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> ?????:
> > >
> > > > On Fri, 2017-11-03 at 10:26 +0300, Mikhail Kurinnoi wrote:
> > > > > This patch provide changes in order to allow metadata changes
> > > > > for inode without xattr support.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
> > > > >
> > > > > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
> > > > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > > > b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index
> > > > > 9826c02e2db8..51151c43433d 100644 ---
> > > > > a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++
> > > > > b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -294,8 +294,7 @@ static
> > > > > int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char
> > > > > *xattr_name, if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) return 0;
> > > > > evm_status =
> > > > > evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
> > > > > - if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
> > > > > - (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> > > > > + if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)
> > > > > return 0;
> > > > > goto out;
> > > > > }
> > > > > @@ -319,12 +318,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry
> > > > > *dentry, const char *xattr_name, -EPERM, 0);
> > > > > }
> > > > > out:
> > > > > - if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
> > > > > - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
> > > > > d_backing_inode(dentry),
> > > > > - dentry->d_name.name,
> > > > > "appraise_metadata",
> > > > > -
> > > > > integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
> > > > > - -EPERM, 0);
> > > > > - return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
> > > > > + if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
> > > > > + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
> > > > > + return 0;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
> > > > > d_backing_inode(dentry),
> > > > > + dentry->d_name.name,
> > > > > "appraise_metadata",
> > > > > + integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
> > > > > + -EPERM, 0);
> > > > > + return -EPERM;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > /**
> > > > > @@ -435,7 +437,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > > > > struct iattr *attr) return 0;
> > > > > evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
> > > > > if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
> > > > > - (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> > > > > + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
> > > > > + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
> > > > > return 0;
> > > > > integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
> > > > > d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name,
> > > > > "appraise_metadata",
> > > >
> > > > Since this change is limited to setattr, perhaps it would be
> > > > simpler to test the i_opflags directly, without modifying
> > > > evm_protect_xattr().
> > >
> > > In case of set/remove xattr (evm_inode_setxattr(),
> > > evm_inode_removexattr()), evm should not interact fs module work,
> > > that will provide proper error code.
> > > As I see in __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), error code could be -EOPNOTSUPP
> > > or -EIO, but evm will override it by error code -EPERM. I think,
> > > this is wrong. If we don't have xattr support, let fs module handle
> > > the error code.
> >
> > The patch description described a specific reason for the change. If
> > there is another reason for the change, then either include it in the
> > patch description or provide a separate patch.
>
> You are right, this is really poor description that don't describe
> evm_protect_xattr() changes. I will provide patch v2 with extended
> patch description.
>
> Mimi, is it appropriate changes for evm_inode_setattr(), or should I
> correct patch to test the i_opflags directly instead?
I could be wrong, but I think these are two separate issues and should
be addressed separately. From your explanation, it sounds like you
want to return the real setxattr/removexattr failure status. Perhaps
after making this change, I'll think differently.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-03 18:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-03 7:26 [PATCH] evm: allow metadata changes for inode without xattr support Mikhail Kurinnoi
2017-11-03 16:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-03 17:06 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi
2017-11-03 17:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-03 18:11 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi
2017-11-03 18:26 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-11-03 19:00 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi
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