From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:36316 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752861AbdKJLtr (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Nov 2017 06:49:47 -0500 Subject: Patch "KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read()" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree To: ebiggers@google.com, ben@decadent.org.uk, dhowells@redhat.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: , From: Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 12:49:49 +0100 Message-ID: <1510314589187245@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: keys-trusted-fix-writing-past-end-of-buffer-in-trusted_read.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let know about it. >>From a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2017 00:47:12 +0000 Subject: KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() From: Eric Biggers commit a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 upstream. When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per the documentation for keyctl_read(). We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior of the "encrypted" key type. Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Reported-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/keys/trusted.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1094,20 +1094,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke p = rcu_dereference_key(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; - if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) - return 2 * p->blob_len; - ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; } - kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@google.com are queue-4.4/keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch queue-4.4/keys-trusted-fix-writing-past-end-of-buffer-in-trusted_read.patch