From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ebiggers@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, idryomov@gmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "libceph: don't WARN() if user tries to add invalid key" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 17:06:45 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1511798805147238@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
libceph: don't WARN() if user tries to add invalid key
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
libceph-don-t-warn-if-user-tries-to-add-invalid-key.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b11270853fa3654f08d4a6a03b23ddb220512d8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 21:57:26 -0800
Subject: libceph: don't WARN() if user tries to add invalid key
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit b11270853fa3654f08d4a6a03b23ddb220512d8d upstream.
The WARN_ON(!key->len) in set_secret() in net/ceph/crypto.c is hit if a
user tries to add a key of type "ceph" with an invalid payload as
follows (assuming CONFIG_CEPH_LIB=y):
echo -e -n '\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' \
| keyctl padd ceph desc @s
This can be hit by fuzzers. As this is merely bad input and not a
kernel bug, replace the WARN_ON() with return -EINVAL.
Fixes: 7af3ea189a9a ("libceph: stop allocating a new cipher on every crypto request")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/crypto.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ceph/crypto.c
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c
@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ static int set_secret(struct ceph_crypto
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
- WARN_ON(!key->len);
+ if (!key->len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
key->key = kmemdup(buf, key->len, GFP_NOIO);
if (!key->key) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@google.com are
queue-4.9/lib-mpi-call-cond_resched-from-mpi_powm-loop.patch
queue-4.9/dm-bufio-fix-integer-overflow-when-limiting-maximum-cache-size.patch
queue-4.9/libceph-don-t-warn-if-user-tries-to-add-invalid-key.patch
reply other threads:[~2017-11-27 16:10 UTC|newest]
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