From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: danielj@mellanox.com, bharat@chelsio.com, ddutile@redhat.com,
jgg@mellanox.com, leon@kernel.org, parav@mellanox.com,
paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:19:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1513027151144207@kroah.com> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 315d160c5a4e034a576a13aa21e7235d5c9ec609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 20:10:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand
For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.
This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 23278ed5be45..a337386652b0 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
{
+ u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);
+ bool is_ib = false;
int ret;
+ while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)
+ is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
+
+ /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */
+ if (!is_ib)
+ return 0;
+
qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!qp->qp_sec)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security);
void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
{
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);
/* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to
@@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
int ret;
int i;
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
/* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
* QP security could be marked for an error state
* transition. Wait for this to complete.
@@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
{
int i;
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
/* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
* wait until this QP security structure is processed
* in the QP to error flow before destroying it because
@@ -557,7 +578,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
{
int ret = 0;
struct ib_ports_pkeys *tmp_pps;
- struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps;
+ struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps = NULL;
struct ib_qp *real_qp = qp->real_qp;
bool special_qp = (real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI ||
real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_GSI ||
@@ -565,18 +586,27 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) ||
(qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));
+ WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&
+ rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
+ !real_qp->qp_sec),
+ "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
+ __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
+
/* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
* handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
* enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
* checked as well.
*/
- if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+ if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
qp_attr,
qp_attr_mask);
-
+ if (!new_pps) {
+ mutex_unlock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
/* Add this QP to the lists for the new port
* and pkey settings before checking for permission
* in case there is a concurrent cache update
@@ -600,7 +630,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
qp_attr_mask,
udata);
- if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+ if (new_pps) {
/* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
* ports_pkeys structure.
*/
@@ -631,6 +661,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
u16 pkey;
int ret;
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))
+ return 0;
+
ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -665,6 +698,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
{
int ret;
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+ return 0;
+
ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -690,6 +726,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
{
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+ return;
+
security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
@@ -697,6 +736,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
{
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
+ return 0;
+
if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
return -EACCES;
next reply other threads:[~2017-12-11 21:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-11 21:19 gregkh [this message]
2017-12-11 21:43 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree Don Dutile
2017-12-11 21:50 ` Greg KH
2017-12-11 21:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-12-11 22:21 ` Greg KH
2017-12-11 21:51 ` Greg KH
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