From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: djeffery@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, ebiggers@google.com,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "Don't leak a key reference if request_key() tries to use a revoked keyring" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 13:10:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1513599010125128@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
Don't leak a key reference if request_key() tries to use a revoked keyring
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
don-t-leak-a-key-reference-if-request_key-tries-to-use-a-revoked-keyring.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 16:45:31 +0000
Subject: Don't leak a key reference if request_key() tries to use a revoked keyring
From: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
commit d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0 upstream.
If a request_key() call to allocate and fill out a key attempts to insert the
key structure into a revoked keyring, the key will leak, using memory and part
of the user's key quota until the system reboots. This is from a failure of
construct_alloc_key() to decrement the key's reference count after the attempt
to insert into the requested keyring is rejected.
key_put() needs to be called in the link_prealloc_failed callpath to ensure
the unused key is released.
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/keys/request_key.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ link_check_failed:
link_prealloc_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+ key_put(key);
kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
return ret;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from djeffery@redhat.com are
queue-3.18/don-t-leak-a-key-reference-if-request_key-tries-to-use-a-revoked-keyring.patch
reply other threads:[~2017-12-18 12:10 UTC|newest]
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