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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: dhowells@redhat.com, ebiggers@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 13:10:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <15135990102944@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring

to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     keys-don-t-permit-request_key-to-construct-a-new-keyring.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 911b79cde95c7da0ec02f48105358a36636b7a71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 11:20:28 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit 911b79cde95c7da0ec02f48105358a36636b7a71 upstream.

If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search.  We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.

Now the kernel gives an error:

	request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/request_key.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -467,6 +467,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_lin
 	if (ret)
 		goto error;
 
+	if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
 	user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
 	if (!user) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dhowells@redhat.com are

queue-3.18/keys-don-t-permit-request_key-to-construct-a-new-keyring.patch
queue-3.18/don-t-leak-a-key-reference-if-request_key-tries-to-use-a-revoked-keyring.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2017-12-18 12:10 UTC|newest]

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